學術演講
主 講／
Prof.
Richard A. Shweder
(William
Claude Reavis Distinguished
Service Professor,
Department of Comparative
Human
Development, University of
Chicago)
講
題 ／ Universalism
Without the Uniformity in
the Study of Morality
時
間
／
2012年 6月1日 (星期五)
10：00∼12：00
地 點
／
民族所新大樓三樓 2319 會議室
abstract:
Extreme characterizations of
moral relativism and moral
universalism abound but they
are not the end of the
story. Many so-called moral
relativists in anthropology
will recoil at extreme
characterizations of their
doctrine. They will recoil
because in their own minds
their primary aim is not to
subvert the entire process
of genuine moral debate by
denying the existence of
moral truths. Many who
embrace moral universalism
in anthropology will recoil
at extreme characterizations
of their doctrine as well.
They will recoil because in
their own minds the primary
aim of their objectivism
(and invocation of moral
absolutes) is not to
congratulate their own way
of life as the best or only
way to live a moral life but
rather to provide insiders
and outsiders, minority
groups and majority groups,
(in other words everyone)
with a common frame of
reference for engaging in
genuine moral debates and
for judging what is right
and what is wrong in ones
own society, and in other
societies as well. In this
talk I sketch a conception
of moral relativism as
“universalism without the
uniformity.” This is an
approach to the
anthropological study of
morality inspired by Michel
de Montaigne (and many
others) in which one tries
to credibly advance one
particular type of answer to
the central question posed
by the global diversity of
concrete moral judgments.
That central question of
course is why do the many
peoples of the world
disagree with each other so
much in their concrete moral
judgments and why don’t
those judgments possess the
universality that is
characteristic of the idea
of truth?
☆☆
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中央研究院民族學研究所 敬邀
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