

Modernization and Extended Kinship Change in Taipei, Taiwan: 1963-1991
1963-1991

Robert M. Marsh

Brown University

Providence, RI

Cheng-kuang Hsu

Academia Sinica

Taipei, Taiwan ROC

* Direct correspondence to Robert M. Marsh, Department of Sociology, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912. This research was supported in 1963 by the (U. S.) Social Science Research Council and in 1991-93 by two foundations in the Republic of China--the Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation and the National Science Council. This help, and that of our universities-- Brown and National Tsing Hua--as well as the Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, is gratefully acknowledged.

*Presented at the conference on 'Family
Modernization - East and West', held by
the University of Indianapolis, Ind. a,
in August, 1993*

Abstract

We re-open the issue of whether societal modernization weakens extended kinship solidarity and leads to the nuclear family as both the ideal and the actual pattern. Data come from two sample surveys of the Taiwanese population of Taipei, conducted 28 years apart, in 1963 and 1991. The rapid economic development and social change in Taiwan during these three decades have led to an outcome unexpected in earlier theory: ideal and actual patterns of extended kinship have changed in *opposite* directions. The ideal patterns that prescribe various obligations people have to their extended kin have generally declined significantly, while behavioral indicators of solidarity with kin generally show a significantly higher level of contact in 1991 than in 1963.

We offer several explanations of these apparently contradictory developments. The decline in ideal obligations is consistent with with earlier modernization theory explanations. The rise in actual contact with kin can be explained by the desire to "return to one's roots" through greater contact with kin, but on a voluntary rather than obligatory basis; increases in affluence and leisure time; more convenient transportation and communications; deliberate efforts at the social construction of tradition in ways that encourage more contact with kin; and the addition of bilateral to patrilineal kin contacts.

Modernization and Extended Kinship Change in Taipei, Taiwan: 1963-1991

Students of the family and kinship in various societies have long been concerned with the strength of ties among extended kin--relatives of blood, marriage and adoption through one's father, mother, siblings, spouse and children. An analytical distinction is often drawn between *ideal* normative patterns and *actual* behavioral patterns of extended kinship. In the present study of the Taiwanese (Hokkien and Hakka) population of Taipei, we attempt to assess the strength of ideal and actual extended kinship ties.

Ideal, normative extended kinship ties: How do the Taiwanese answer the following questions: To what range of extended kin do we owe obligations? Should we maintain close relationships with extended kin? Give them economic or other forms of aid? Obedience? Respect? Do we have the same obligations to extended kin as to our parents?

Actual, behavioral extended kinship ties: There are various occasions which Taiwanese may or may not use to get together with extended kin. These include annual ceremonial occasions (New Year's, *pai pai* festivals, ancestor worship at the *Ch'ing Ming* festival) and certain *rites de passage* (marriage, child birth or *man yueh*, an elder kin's birthday or *chu shou*, and funerals).

Thus we shall infer that ideal kinship ties among the Taiwanese are strong to the extent that obligations of several kinds are prescribed as being owed to a wide range of extended kin; and actual kinship ties will be regarded as strong to the extent that Taiwanese frequently attend a variety of types of gatherings with extended kin.

Do ideal and actual patterns of extended kinship solidarity follow the same parallel course during societal modernization--both decreasing, both increasing, or both remaining unchanged? That both would follow the same course was a common assumption in earlier theory. Our data from Taiwan indicate that ideal obligations to extended kin declined, while actual behavioral ties to extended kin increased. We explore and attempt to explain

this unexpected finding.

Tracing changes in the strength of ideal and actual extended kinship ties in relation to broader social changes poses the difficult problem of combining systematic, representative samples of populations with the relatively long time spans required for significant societal changes to occur. The two common research strategies represent trade-offs. The farther back in time we go, the more difficult it becomes to obtain representative samples of data on people's sense of their ideal obligations and actual behavioral ties to extended kin. Representative sample surveys can overcome this problem, but tend to have data from only a single point in time or at best a short time period. In the present study of the Taiwanese population of Taipei, the data come from two comparable representative sample surveys conducted 28 years apart, the first in 1963, when Taiwan's urbanization and industrialization were just on the verge of the significant rates of change that were to come, and the second in 1991, by which time Taiwan had become a highly urbanized, industrialized and relatively affluent society.

After considering theoretical arguments for why kinship solidarity might be expected to change in certain ways, and the historical background of kinship in Taiwan, we shall describe our research methods and findings. Finally, the implications of the findings will be discussed.

Social Development and Extended Kinship Solidarity

The strength or solidarity of extended kinship ties can be thought of as varying between two theoretical poles. At one extreme is an organized corporate extended kinship system, e.g., a traditional Chinese patrilineal lineage. Ideal extended kinship solidarity is high with mutual obligations prescribed among numerous kin. Actual kinship solidarity may be high only among the elite or economically more prosperous strata because poverty, high mortality (short life span) and other factors may restrict extended kinship solidarity among the mass of the population.

Modernization theory contends that "all social systems are moving fast or slowly toward some form of the conjugal family system and also toward industrialization" (Goode 1982:176). There are two versions of what the *lowest* level of solidarity among extended kin would be in a modern society with a conjugal family system. The more extreme form is Parsons' (1943) characterization of "the kinship system of the contemporary United States": both ideal and actual kinship patterns favor a conjugal family type in which the household, consisting of only a married couple and their pre-adult children, is structurally isolated from all extended kin. In this theoretically extreme case, there is no *network* of extended kinship ties linking related families.

For a society like pre-twentieth century China, whose ideal kinship pattern was the organized corporate patrilineage, Goode (1982) predicted a change in extended kinship during industrialization that is less extreme than Parsons' version. The change would be toward a non-corporate kinship network. In the modern conjugal family system that emerges as both the ideal and the actual pattern, although the nuclear family's network of ties with extended kin is weaker than in the previous corporate patrilineal kinship system, the nuclear family is still part of a network of kin ties. Thus, even in a modern conjugal family system, "[a] majority of . . . families report that they engage in many types of exchanges with people in their kinship network, and these range from simple services to large gifts" (Goode 1982:109).

The implications of this line of thought for our Taipei data are as follows. Between the 1963 and 1991 surveys, Taipei, like the rest of Taiwan, experienced very rapid economic development, industrialization, and post-industrial modernization. These are among the most important conditions making for change in extended kinship solidarity. They make for change by increasing the amount of spatial and social mobility, by developing more spheres of life structured in non-kinship terms, and in other ways. Following Goode, we hypothesize that Taipei's rapid development has weakened especially the normative, ideal aspects of extended kinship solidarity. "Thus, the couple cannot count on a large number of

kinfolk for help, just as these kin cannot call upon the couple for services. Neither couple nor kinfolk have many *rights* with respect to the other, and so the reciprocal *obligations* are few" (Goode 1963:8).

As for actual interaction with extended kin, the basis for an hypothesis is less clear. Goode, on a single page (Goode 1982:109) states, on one hand that interactions with kin "do not occur as frequently as in the past," but on the other hand, "each family unit maintains contacts with a wide range of relatives." The conjugal family unit may be more independent of the extended kinship network than in the past, but if interaction with extended kin is less *obligatory*, more a matter of *choice*, it may increase, or at least not decline in frequency. This could happen under a variety of circumstances, such as the need to use kin contacts for migrant adjustments to life in Taipei, and the ease and cost of transportation and communication in overcoming spatial distance from kin.

Extended Kinship Solidarity in Taiwan

The source provinces from which the ancestors of the Taiwanese population came--Fujian and Guangdong--had extended corporate patrilineal lineages, as an ideal family pattern for all strata, if an actually approximated pattern only among the elite (Freedman 1958, 1966). In the pioneer society of Taiwan, however, lineages were weaker. Large localized lineages generally didn't survive the move to Taiwan, where settlers came either as individuals or in small family groups. To the extent that lineages did survive in Taiwan, they were of relatively small size and minimum formalization. In eighteenth century Taiwan, the usual bases of social organization were the native place on the mainland, the community temple and a common surname (at that time, 20 per cent of the population were named either Chen or Lin). These factors, rather than powerful lineages, were the bases of mutual aid.

Land Reform in the 1950's deprived lineages of most of their economic underpinnings, though not necessarily of their ritual and other bases of solidarity (Cohen 1969). In more recent times, Barrett (1989:467) contends, "most lineages (if they existed at all) had little

power over the sale or rental of land." Lineage segmentation occurred, in which a branch of a lineage established its own corporate estate. Ancestral halls (*tsung-tz'u*) owned and managed by a lineage and used for the rituals of the whole lineage were possible only for the wealthy and powerful lineages. Harrell (1982:124-34) found that agnatic ties (between blood relatives) may be important in forming dyadic bonds, but they share this importance with ties of affinity, matrilineality, sworn kinship and simple friendship. There was no great solidarity among agnatic kin¹. Thus, Taiwanese local communities continue to be defined more in terms of territoriality and ritual--the local temple and temple deity--than extended kinship.

Kinship ties are not absent, however. Even when the only common property of a lineage is nominal--an ancestral tablet in the main room of one's home--it symbolizes the unity of the domestic line. Members of the lineage may gather and worship their ancestor on New Year's Day, with each household bringing offerings. Members of the lineage help each other at marriages and funerals of fellow members (Suenari 1986). Gallin notes that some but not all kinds of traditional rural lineage organization became weakened in Taipei. Kin-based relationships continue to be significant for migrants to Taipei, "even though in the city these relationships function only on an individual rather than a group level" (Gallin 1978:281). Greenhalgh (1984) found that in urban Taiwan, although the extended kin group breaks up into smaller nuclear households, resources continue to flow between units of the larger *chia*, as members seek mobility and adaptation in the city.

The 1963 and 1991 Taipei Surveys

In 1963, the first author of this paper conducted a survey research project to study social stratification, class and mobility, work, family and kinship, and attitudes toward social issues in Taipei, Taiwan. In the sampling, the universe was defined as male Taiwanese household heads between the ages of 20 and 69, living in Taipei city. Resources limited the intended sample N to approximately 500, so we deliberately omitted two important population groups, Taiwanese women and mainlander Chinese. Taipei in 1963

was divided into 10 administrative districts (*ch'ü*), which were subdivided into 447 *li*, and the *li* into 7,391 *lin* (neighborhoods). The stages of the systematic, multistage area sampling were accordingly: (1) a selection of every eighth *li* in the city after a random number start; (2) withing the 56 sample *li*, a selection of every third *lin* (3) withing the 317 sample *lin*, a selection of every fifth Taiwanese household whose head was male and between 20 and 69 years old. The sampling stages were carried out in the 10 district offices (*ch'ü kung so*) where registers are kept for all households. Interviews were completed with 507 respondents.

The 1991 survey used the same interview schedule questions and the same sampling design, but given the 28-year time lapse, we made no attempt to re-interview the same individuals. Between 1963 and 1991, the city of Taipei's population had grown from 1,027,648 to 2,719,659 and its area had expanded by administrative incorporation of adjacent areal units from 67 to 272 square kilometers. The per cent of the Taipei population that was Taiwanese rather than mainlander Chinese has risen from 61.7 to 73.1. Taipei Municipality by 1991 was divided into 12 *ch'ü*, 440 *li* and 9,818 *lin*. *Ch'ü* had between 18 and 56 *li*. We stratified *ch'ü* into those with fewer than 30 *li*, from each of which we drew two sample *li*, and those with 30 or more *li*, from each of which we drew three sample *li*. The target sample N for each *ch'ü* was proportionate to the estimated number of Taiwanese households in all Taipei who lived in that *ch'ü*. Every *n*th household in the sample *li* that had a male Taiwanese head between 20 and 69 years old was selected for the sample. This sampling interval varied across *li* due to variations in the proportion of Taiwanese households. The 545 people interviewed were living in 431 of the 749 sample *lin* in the the 34 sample *li*. In both 1963 and 1991, interviews were conducted in respondents' homes by students from National Taiwan University and other local universities. In summary:

	1963	1991
Number of <i>ch'ü</i> sampled	10	12

Number of <i>li</i> sampled	56	34
Number of <i>lin</i> sampled	317	749
Number of households sampled	642	1282
Number of completed interviews ²	507	545

Having comparable survey data spanning 28 years--a generation--is of great value in the testing of theories about long-run processes of social change.

The Trend Toward Nuclear Households in Taipei

The standard classification of households--units of coresidence whose members eat together--includes three types of family units (*chia*): (1) the *nuclear* family of a married couple and their unmarried children; (2) the *stem* family of a married couple, one of their married children (usually a son) and spouse, and the unmarried grandchildren; and (3) the *joint* family of the parents, two or more of their married children (usually sons) with their spouses and children and any unmarried siblings of the middle generation. Large compounds permitted joint family households to exist in some parts of rural Taiwan. The greater cost of housing in crowded urban areas like Taipei reduced this possibility. It is useful to know what proportion of households in Taipei are exclusively nuclear³, because while this need not preclude solidarity with extended kin, it may make it more difficult than when more households were of the stem or joint family type.

The per cent of the Taipei sample households that were exclusively nuclear significantly increased, from 58.2% in 1963 to 72.3% in 1991 ($\phi = .15^{**}$)⁴. Thus, by 1991, only 27.7% of the sample households had any extra-nuclear kin living with them. For some readers, the latter figure will attest to the continued importance of extended family coresidence in Taipei, but the trend is clearly toward the nuclear family as the most common type of household.

Norms Concerning Obligations to Extended Kin

Traditionally, the "six kinship ties" (*liu ch'in*) were those between husband and wife,

parents and children, brothers, the children of brothers, the children of brothers' children, and the children of brothers' childrens' children. In addition to these, one also had mutual obligations to the immediate relatives on one's mother's and wife's sides of the family. It was this greater kinship circle, not the household alone, that constituted the importance of kinship in China. If one had none of the "six kinship ties" to rely on (*liu ch'in wu k'ao*), it was said that "one had nobody to turn to." In a corporate kin group like the patrilineage there were collective rights and duties which particular members of the extended kin group enforced over other members. Kin members would expect each other to conform to a relatively wide range of kinship obligations.

Our Taipei interview schedule refers to obligations as *ying-ch'in te tse-jen*. After asking what obligations people⁵ have to their parents (*fu-mu*), we next asked whether people have obligations to relatives (*ch'in-ch'i*) who are not one's parents⁶. Just under half of the 1963 Taipei sample (47.9%) and just over half (51.6%) in 1991 said people *do not* have obligations to other relatives (Table 1, row 1), a non-significant difference between the 1963 and the 1991 samples. The initial reaction of nearly half of the Taiwanese respondents was to eschew obligations toward non-parental extended kin.

(Table 1 about here)

For those who said there *are* obligations to extended kin other than parents, we first asked: "To which relatives do people have obligations?" The 52% of the 1963 respondents who said obligations were owed to kin specified the following kin: all relatives, i.e., those in one's patrilineage (*tsung tsu*), relatives through one's mother and affinal relatives through one's wife (13.1%); patrilateral and matrilateral kin (9.5%); patrilateral kin only (8.5%); unspecified "close relatives" (6.4%); relatives with whom you have good personal relations (2.4%); and various other sets of kin (7.0%); 5.2% said obligations were owed to kin, but did not indicate which kin. Among the 48% of the 1991 respondents who believe

obligations are owed to kin, the following kin were named: "all blood relatives and relatives through marriage" (8.8%); various sets of kin we coded as a medium range of extended kin, e.g., close blood relatives, relatives with whom you have close personal relationships, blood relatives within three degrees of kinship, elders in the blood line, relatives through one's father and mother (21.3%); and various sets of kin we coded as "a few relatives," e.g., grandparents, or siblings, or father's and mother's brothers, or "relatives who have economic problems" (18%).

We re-coded these responses into four categories in order to make a comparison of the 1963 and 1991 *range of kin* to whom obligations are owed. The per cent who said obligations are owed to "all kin" or "most kin" (as opposed to "few" or "no kin") was 38.7% in 1963 and 30.1% in 1991, a non-significant decline (Table 1, row 2). Those who believe people owe obligations to extended kin have not significantly narrowed the range of extended kin to whom these are owed.

Table 1 lists particular obligations to extended kin in 1963 and 1991, in order of the frequency of their support in the 1963 sample. In Part A we list the spontaneously-mentioned obligations in response to the open-ended question, "What kinds of obligations do children have toward relatives?" The most common was: provide services to kin, e.g., help with chores at home, mentioned by 23.5% in 1963 and 20.7% in 1991 (a non-significant decline). This is coded "non-economic aid," to distinguish it from the next category, economic aid, e.g., give money, financial aid to kin, mentioned by nine percent of the respondents in both 1963 and 1991.

Each of the other obligations in Part A was mentioned spontaneously by fewer than 10% of the respondents in 1963 and 1991. This is noteworthy because in the interview schedule, the open-ended obligations to kin question came immediately after a pre-coded question, "Which of the following obligations do you think children owe to their **parents**?" Having just been asked about five specific types of obligations to parents--obedience, respect, maintain a close relationship, help with work and house chores, and financial aid--

the tendency by most respondents not to draw on these in volunteering obligations toward other kin is all the more striking. Only one of the types of obligations to kin spontaneously mentioned changed significantly: maintaining emotional harmony with relatives increased significantly from 5.5% in 1963 to 9.4% in 1991 ($\phi = .07^*$).

Part B of Table 1 presents the responses to the pre-coded obligations to kin questions. When presented with specific kinds of obligations, the 1963 respondents were much more likely to agree that people have these obligations than they had been in the previous open-ended responses. In 1963, the ranking of obligations by per cent agreement was: maintain close, intimate relationships (93.1%), respect (91.9%), obedience (66.7%), economic aid (51.9%), help at work and at home (46.5%), the same obligations as to parents (45.2%) and miscellaneous other obligations (20.7%). *By 1991, support for every one of these pre-coded obligations had significantly declined, often by a very large degree.* The most marked declines in obligations toward relatives other than parents were: maintain close relationships (from 93.1% to 42%), obedience (from 66.7% to 20.9%), respect (from 91.9% to 46.6%), and economic aid (from 51.9% to 16.1%).

We can summarize the results of Table 1 by calculating ratios for the number of obligations mentioned relative to the total number of respondents.

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1991</u>
N mentioning specific open ended obligations to extended kin	<u>277</u>	<u>317</u>
Total N	507 = 0.55	545 = 0.58
N agreeing with specific pre-coded obligations to extended kin	<u>2,109</u>	<u>898</u>
Total N	507 = 4.16	545 = 1.65

Thus, while the number of spontaneously-mentioned obligations per respondent was

equally low in 1963 and 1991 (0.55 and 0.58, respectively), the number of agreements with specific pre-coded obligations declined from 4.16 per respondent in 1963 to 1.65 in 1991. The chi-square for this difference--980.042--is significant beyond the .001 level.

We are thus faced with these findings concerning obligations Taiwanese think people have toward relatives other than parents: (1) The per cent who think there are (unspecified) obligations to kin--about half the sample in both 1963 and 1991--has not significantly changed; (2) very few respondents spontaneously proposed any given specific type of obligation in either 1963 or 1991; (3) when asked about specific obligations, a much higher percent in 1963 agreed that the obligation exists, but this tendency declined so much by 1991 that the predominant picture is one where most of the Taiwanese of Taipei no longer expect people to meet these specific obligations to kin.

Extended Kinship Behavior

Having considered some aspects of *ideal* kinship patterns, we next turn to actual kinship patterns. Recall that the former refer to what people say they *ought to do* for kin, while the latter describes how they actually behave toward kin. Table 2 summarizes several areas of actual behavior relevant to extended kinship relationships. Although 34% of the 1963 Taipei sample had spent most of their life in villages or towns before moving to Taipei (24.3% in the 1991 sample), fully 42.2% of the 1963 sample and 58.3% of the 1991 sample had at some time during their life lived in a village or small town. Our first kinship behavior questions asked (1) Do you still maintain contact with relatives who live in that village or town? During the previous year, (2) have you visited them in that village or town? and (3) have those relatives in that village or town visited you? We combined these three items into a Village Contact index, scored from 0 to 3, depending on how many of the three questions the respondent answered "yes" to. In Table 2, we see that somewhat more than two-thirds--68.4% in 1963, 69.3% in 1991--of the Taiwanese of Taipei had the high score of 3. Thus, among the considerable proportion of our Taipei respondents who used to live in a village or town, over two-thirds of them continue to keep

in touch, and exchange visits, with kin from that village or town. The relatively strong tendency to maintain interaction with rural and small town kin was not significantly different in 1991 than in 1963. Ties with rural and small town kin have not become attenuated.

Table 2 about here.

The next set of questions stated a number of *occasions* Taiwanese society provides which might be used to get together with extended kin, especially those not in one's immediate (nuclear family) household. These include *annual ceremonial occasions* --New Year's, festivals (*pai-pai*) and ancestor worship--and certain *rites de passage* --marriage, child birth (*man-yueh*), birthdays of elder kin (*chu-shou*), and funerals. Table 2 lists these in order of their prevalence in 1963. We shall discuss them in that order, noting the degree of change by 1991.

The most common occasion for kin gatherings in 1963 was weddings, attended by 62.7% of the Taipei respondents. Such gatherings are, of course, centrally important in terms of kinship, for they signify and symbolize the linking of two different families (*chia tsu*), the incorporation of the bride into the husband's patrilineage, the commencement of a new family and, if accompanied by neolocal residence, of a new household. The prevalence of attending weddings with extended kin during the previous year increased significantly to 71.6% by 1991 ($\phi = .09^*$).

Equally frequent with weddings, in 1963, was attending *pai-pai* festivals with kin, done by 62.7% of the sample during the previous year. *Pai-pai* were originally festivals to worship a deity in a local temple such as Matsu, the Goddess of the Sea, who was worshipped by fishermen, the daughters of Matsu-- *erh Ma*, *san Ma*, etc. Each *pai-pai* festival is centered on a local temple and its deity, and is essentially a local community

activity, organized each year by different worshipping groups. One would never invite *only* one's kin to a *pai-pai*, but these festivals are occasions one can use to get together with kin, along with local people.

While the 1963 Taipei survey was in the field, more than 100,000 people swarmed into three of Taipei's most populous districts--Chiencheng, Tatung and Yenping *ch'ü* --one day in early July to attend huge *pai-pai* dinner parties in celebration of the god of Taipei city, Hsia Hai Cheng Huang, whose shrine is on Tihua Street, Section 1. A colorful parade, carrying the local deity wended its way through the major streets of the three districts. For sponsors of a *pai-pai* festival, the emphasis is on showing off with conspicuous spending, as in the *potlatch* known to anthropologists. In the July, 1963 *pai-pai*, well over an estimated NT\$ 50 million (US\$ 1.25 million) was spent. The *China Post* (July 4, 1963) reported that "Practically all families in the three districts held big *pai-pai* dinner parties. Special traffic control was enforced from 12 noon until midnight by Taipei police to relieve the unusually heavy traffic in the *pai-pai* area."

The tendency of our sample to attend *pai-pai* with extended kin dropped significantly from 62.7% in 1963 to 47.9% by 1991 ($\phi = .15^{**}$). If one desires to maintain contact with kin, *pai-pai* dinners and festivals are now much less likely to be the means of doing so. The following are suggested as causes of this decline⁷. First, there has been a partial shift from the original religious meaning of *pai-pai* festivals--e.g., to celebrate Matsu's birthday--to more secular purposes--strengthening ties with one's network of business associates or friends, rather than with kin. One might spend lavishly to invite many people to an outdoor *pai-pai* dinner. During the presidency of Chiang Ching-kuo (1975-1988) the government tried to restrict *pai-pai*, claiming that people wasted too much money in those conspicuous displays (*lang fei*, spending money with nothing to show for it). To support its policy of the priority of economic growth, the government wanted a high savings rate, so it demanded that public employees stop offering *pai-pai* dinners for hundreds of guests, and also tried to dissuade the general public from this activity.

Another reason for the decline in the rate of attendance at *pai-pai* with extended kin by 1991 may be a heightened consciousness of the danger of contaminated food, left outdoors in summer heat for long periods of time. (Although school lunches are more sanitary than *pai-pai* food, students do at times get sick from them in Taiwan.) Finally, the sheer congestion that a *pai-pai* generates may deter some people from using it for a kin gathering.

Gallin contends that "economic development has also been accompanied by an elaboration of religious practices in rural and urban Taiwan. Participation in religious festivals (*pai pai*), magical rituals and religious pilgrimages has increased" (Gallin 1985:55). Although this statement refers to a period earlier than our 1991 survey, it is not necessarily inconsistent with our survey finding. As the population of Taipei has expanded, the absolute number of people attending a *pai-pai* or other festival could remain as large, or even increase, while the *per cent* of the population who attend with kin declines, as in our 1963-1991 comparison.

The third most frequent occasion for kin gatherings in 1963 Taipei was the Chinese lunar New Year's, the greatest of all Chinese festivals, held in late January or early February. Many ancient customs are associated with *Kuo Nien*, or passing the old year. All outstanding debts must be paid, everyone sports new clothing, and people present their relatives, friends and colleagues with little red envelopes stuffed with "lucky money" for the New Year. Bright red is the dominant color in clothing, decor and even food, for food symbolizes good luck in China. At midnight, there is the staccato fusillade of millions of firecrackers and sky rockets, which are meant to frighten away evil monsters from everyone's homes. One of the meanings of *nien* is the name of the monster, *nien shou*, so *Kuo Nien* means passing the monster of the old year. Cohen reports that in north China, lunar New Year's and the Ch'ing Ming festival (to be discussed below) were both occasions that "provided lineage-wide contexts for ancestor worship and associated feasting and visiting" (Cohen 1990:519). The emphasis at New Year's celebrations was on "networking

within a shared genealogically defined social sphere" (Cohen 1990:521).

The celebration of New Year's with members of one's extended kin has increased significantly in our Taipei samples, from 56.3% in 1963 to 77.4% in 1991 ($\phi = .23^{**}$). One general explanation of the several types of kin gatherings that have increased according to our data can be noted at this point. The Taiwanese are much more affluent in the 1990s than they were in the early 1960s. Although travel to get together with kin living elsewhere in the island may be more congested, it is less costly in relation to real income, and generally more rapid and efficient. With personal ownership of motor vehicles so high, it is subjectively more within the realm of possibility and expectations that people leave Taipei for holidays. Those who stay in Taipei report that the city seems almost empty of people. In fact, there is a large exodus from Taipei even on regular weekends now, and this is all the more true on longer holidays.

The fourth most frequent occasion for kin gatherings in 1963 were funerals, and attendance with extended kin at these has significantly increased from 40.5% in 1963 to 53.9% in 1991 ($\phi = .13^{**}$). This increase cannot be explained on demographic grounds, since the death rate in Taiwan for both sexes and all ages *declined* from 6.03 (per 1,000 population) in 1963 to 5.16 in 1989 (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Republic of China, 1990: Table 13). The rise in the attending of funerals with kin may, therefore, be an expression of the strengthening of the sentiments of kinship solidarity, a point we shall develop further below.

Ancestor worship (*chi tsu*) is the ancient rite performed in honor of one's ancestors. This is done mainly on *Ch'ing Ming chieh*, the "clear and bright festival", April 5 (April 4 in leap years). It is also known as tomb-sweeping day, and the traditional concept was that the larger kin group would gather at the lineage grave site, sweep it clean of debris, remove weeds, plant new trees, shrubs and flowers, and share in the offering of food sacrifices to the ancestors' spirits. "Lineage organization implied ancestor worship, a Confucian value of high order" (Freedman 1961-2:325). According to Cohen, the Ch'ing

Ming festival in north China was a "communal display of solidarity whereby each member family would send a representative to participate in activities centered on the lineage graveyard that involved both feasting and graveside ritual" (Cohen 1990:521).

Our surveys show a significant, and very marked *increase* in the attendance of the Taipei respondents at ancestor worship ceremonies during the previous year: from 39.2% in 1963 to 75.0% in 1991 ($\phi = .36^{**}$). Indeed, the magnitude of this change is one of the largest of any variable in our 1963-1991 comparisons. The increase in ancestor worship as an occasion for an extended kin gathering is of a magnitude comparable to the tremendous educational upgrading of the Taipei population, the entrance of women into the labor force, the expansion of the living space of Taipei dwelling units, the decline in the number of persons per household, and a few other dramatic changes in our samples between 1963 and 1991.

The explanation of this marked increase in the traditional practice of tomb-sweeping and ancestor worship as an occasion for extended kinship interaction may be partly a matter of the active role of the Republic of China (ROC) in distinguishing itself from mainland China by state intervention in the preservation of traditional Chinese culture. While the communist regime on mainland China tried for decades to wipe out "superstitious, feudal" religious-based extended kinship practices like ancestor worship (Whyte and Parish 1984: 223, 313-17), the ROC on Taiwan officially prided itself on fostering traditional Chinese culture. With regard to ancestor worship, the state took advantage of the fact that President Chiang Kai-shek died on the day of the Ch'ing Ming Festival, April 5, in 1975, to make that day henceforth one of double significance: a national mourning holiday for the Generalissimo, and for one's ancestors. The official Ch'ing Ming holiday was extended after 1975 from one or two days to three or four days. To implement its policy, the state now arranges more public transportation and other means for Taipei residents to journey to their ancestral grave sites, wherever these may be on the island. Some Taiwan specialists doubt that the increased interest in Ch'ing Ming

festivities is due to the state's role. They argue that the Taiwanese do not give much credence to Chiang Kai-shek, and point out that the state's attempts to diminish *pai-pai* celebrations were not very successful. The alternative interpretation is that Ch'ing Ming ancestor worship is a renewed expression of identity, both ethnic (Chinese as well as Taiwanese) and family. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that while the highest rate of travel in Taiwan is still for lunar New Year's, the Ch'ing Ming Festival is crowding it now as the second heaviest in travel.

The significant increase in extended kin gatherings for ancestor worship is a clear instance, though by no means the only one, of what Goodkind (1991) calls "the deliberate, conscious social construction of tradition." Religious behavior in temples and other manifestations of Taiwanese folk religion declined during the 1960s and 1970s, but have been reviving since 1980. Ancestor worship can be said to be a phenomenon of modernization: precisely because social change has been so rapid, the Taiwanese need some "return to their roots." When the Kuomintang first moved to Taiwan in the 1940s, it systematically ignored Taiwan history and local customs. Nowadays, the Taiwanese feel freer to have nativistic movement-like revivals, such as ancestor worship. Some have pointed out that revivals of traditional religious customs enable the Taiwanese to stress their distinctness relative to mainlander Chinese. In an argument similar to the one presented here, Goodkind noted that as Taiwanese seek to have fewer children, they become more concerned with the *quality* of their offspring. Modern contraceptive devices enable them to time births in "auspicious" years of the traditional Chinese Zodiacal calendar, such as the year of the Dragon, 1976 and 1988, when there was a sharp rise in the birth rate. In this area, as in the use of ancestor worship for extended kin gatherings, Goodkind seems correct to infer that "modernizing forces themselves continue to allow new and unexpected species of traditions to bloom" (Goodkind 1991: 679).

But there is also a secular function subserved by kin gathering to observe Ch'ing Ming and ancestor worship. The lineage tomb and grave site may be outside Taipei, in a less

polluted, pleasant, park-like setting. The kin group can use the occasion for a picnic and a diverting escape from crowded, polluted Taipei. And the increase in ancestor worship by 1991 may also be due to a tendency in modern Taiwan to shift somewhat from exclusive emphasis on the patrilineal lineage to more bilateral forms of kinship. As we shall suggest later, wives in urban Taiwan no longer must sever themselves so fully from their own parental lineage after marriage. Social interaction with the wife's side of the family has become more common in places like Taipei. Accordingly, the notable rise in kin gatherings for ancestor worship may reflect a more common practice of attending both the husband's and the wife's ancestral tombs.

Traditionally, the childbirth (*sheng ch'an*) ceremony, especially for a male baby, was as important as birthdays or funerals. The parents of the new baby would announce his birth by sending food to relatives and friends. Around the time the baby is one month old (*man yueh*) the relatives would come to see him, bringing red-wrapped gift money (*hung pao*). As a social network activity announcing to kin a new member of the family, this practice is more common in rural than in urban Taiwan. The per cent of our Taipei samples who had attended gatherings with kin for *man yueh* during the previous year was 34.1 in 1963, and declined non-significantly to 30.1 in 1991.

The least attended of the occasions for kin gatherings in 1963 were elder family members' birthdays (*chu shou*). The 32.6% of the Taipei sample who attended birthdays of elder kin in 1963 was exceeded by a significant increase to 44.4% who did this in 1991 ($\phi = .12^{**}$). Our interview schedule asked about only those special birthdays of older people who reach the age of 70 or 80 (celebrated on the person's 69th or 79th birthday, one year in advance, to make sure the monster, time, does not claim the person before the actual 70th or 80th birthday). These are *chu shou*, celebrating long life, as opposed to ordinary birthdays, *sheng jih*.

We have analyzed seven types of occasions on which Taiwanese can get together with their extended kin. For five of these--weddings, New Year's, funerals, ancestor worship,

and birthdays--there was a significant increase from 1963 to 1991 in the percent who attended with kin. Only one type-- *pai-pai* festivals--showed a significant decline as an occasion for meeting kin, and there was no significant change in the practice of meeting kin for childbirth ceremonies. For these areas of extended kinship behavior, the preponderant change, then, was toward a higher frequency of interaction with extended kin.

This can be seen in two other summary measures. We summed the number of these seven types of occasions each respondent had attended with kin during the previous year, and since some occasions could occur more than once a year, e.g., weddings, funerals, and birthdays, we also asked how many *times* one had attended all kinds of family gatherings during the previous year. Table 2 reports these as the per cent of the respondents who attended five or more *times*, which increased significantly from 43.9% in 1963 to 58.9% in 1991 (Tau-c = .20**); and the percent who attended four or more of the seven *types* of occasions, which also increased significantly from 39.1% in 1963 to 61.9% in 1991 (Tau-c = .28**).

The last item in Table 2 deals with a different context in which extended kinship ties may operate. The kinship basis of many urban economic activities in Taiwan--such as the small store run by a man and his wife--has been widely remarked in the literature. What is less clear is the importance of kinship in larger economic enterprises, in public organizations, etc. We asked "Have you ever relied on your relatives' (*ch'in-ch'i*) in getting a job or a promotion?" Only 9.6% of the 1963 Taipei respondents admitted doing this, but this rose significantly to 17.5% in 1991 ($\phi = .11^{**}$). While this aspect of what we are conceptualizing as extended kinship solidarity increased, our evidence suggests that depending upon kin to get a job or a promotion was a relatively uncommon pattern in both the 1963 and 1991 samples. It may be that not many respondents had relatives in a position to get them a job or promotion. This is not to say that one no longer needs *huan-hsi* ("connections") to get ahead in Taipei. But people may be relying more on newspapers to find jobs than was the case in the past.

Discussion and Conclusion

We have seen that ideal and actual patterns of extended kinship among the Taiwanese of Taipei have changed in *opposite* directions between 1963 and 1991. The *ideal patterns* that prescribe various obligations people have to their extended kin (other than parents) have generally declined significantly over the 28-year period. The Taiwanese in 1991 were much less likely to think they *should* have close relationships with kin, respect and obey them, give them economic aid, help them at work or with chores at home, or meet the same obligations to extended kin as are fulfilled toward parents. During the same time period, however, the behavioral indicators of solidarity with extended kin--what Taiwanese actually do--generally show an increased frequency of interaction with extended kin at gatherings for ancestor worship, New Year's, weddings, birthdays and funerals. Thus, ideal patterns of obligations toward extended kin have weakened while actual, behavioral patterns of interaction with extended kin have become stronger. How are we to interpret or explain these apparently contradictory trends?

One interpretation of these trends might be that, whereas the ideal kinship ties include heavy obligations such as providing financial support and obeying relatives, the actual kinship ties we have studied are less onerous activities, such as simply being present together, making trips and putting up with relatives for visits. This would take the edge off our comparison between trends "going in opposite directions." Note, however, that even in this interpretation, despite the onerousness of the ideal obligations to kin, Taipei respondents did see these as obligations more in 1963 than in 1991. The substitution--if that is what is going on--of less onerous actual ties with kin for the more onerous ideal obligations is not inconsistent with what modernization theory predicts for kinship change.

Modernization theory does provide part of the answer. The solidarity of the patrilineage was more an ideal than an actual pattern for most of the Taiwanese population even prior to the urbanization and industrialization of the island. Goode (1963, 1982) argued that in a society like Taiwan, modernization would weaken traditional normative extended kinship

obligations. As the conjugal or nuclear family becomes the ideal family pattern for more of the population, fewer obligations and rights can be expected to be observed toward extended kin. "Neither couple nor kinfolk have many *rights* with respect to the other, and so the reciprocal *obligations* are few" (Goode 1963:8). Our Taipei data show that normative obligations toward extended kin have diminished since the 1960s.

The term for "obligations" used in both the 1963 and 1991 interviews was *tse-jen*, which, in Chinese, has an almost legal connotation--things you *must* do. It carries a more compulsory sense than *i-wu*, another term for duty and moral obligation. *Tse-jen* is certainly different from asking "what kinds of relationships would you *like* your children to have with their relatives?"

Thus, "obligations" toward kin have changed from fixed, formal *musts* and *shoulds* -- what Durkheim (1895;1964) called rules with exteriority and constraint--toward being more voluntaristically defined. It is as though the current notion is: if I wish or can afford to fulfill some action toward kin, I shall do it; but if I do it, it is because I want to, or the special circumstance makes it appropriate, not because of a uniform, externally defined obligation that I must fulfill toward kin.

Modernization theory is less satisfactory with regard to the changes in actual extended kinship behavior in Taipei. Goode recognized that different aspects of family and kinship may move in different directions as a society changes in the direction of a conjugal family system. For example, divorce rates in some societies, already high *before* industrialization, may decline during industrialization, while other societies' divorce rates rise during industrialization. But Goode nowhere explicitly predicted the combination of decreasing normative but increasing actual kinship solidarity that our Taipei data show. The closest he comes to this possibility is: "in spite of the perhaps lessened intensity of extended kinship ties, the ascriptive character of kinship greatly increases the chances of relatively frequent contact" (Goode 1963:76). Many exchanges and interactions do occur from time to time, depending on how friendly kin are with one another and the kinds of needs they

have. "But since these exchanges are not societally required and *do not occur as frequently as in the past*, both extended kin and the nuclear family unit have a weaker basis for social control over one another" (Goode 1982:109, italics added). What does "the past" refer to here? If it means rural or pre-industrial Taiwan, there are no data on attendance at family gatherings precisely comparable to our 1963 and 1991 Taipei data. If "the past" means simply 1963 in contrast to 1991, then Goode's assertion is flatly wrong, since actual interaction with kin in this study has become significantly more, not less, frequent.

How, then, are we to account for the increase in actual contact with extended kin among the Taiwanese of Taipei? This paper has suggested several specific reasons for the higher levels of sociability with extended kin in the 1990s than in the 1960s. Transportation and communication are more convenient for overcoming spatial distance from kin; there is more affluence and more leisure time and perhaps less of a compulsion to be at work to maximize income; one response to the very rapid pace of social change has been a desire to "return to one's roots" through greater contact with kin; the state in the Republic of China has emphasized kinship as a traditional Confucian virtue; and there have been other popular, deliberate efforts at the social construction of tradition in ways that encourage more contact with kin. Another reason is that as the sentiments of kinship change from obligation to choice, extended kin may become "ascriptive friends," i.e., one interacts with kin because one likes them as persons, in the same way as one associates with non-kin who are friends.

Finally, our Taipei data do fit one of Goode's ideal type characteristics of the modern conjugal family system: the descent lines of the father and mother are of nearly equal importance. There is a shift from patrilineal to bilateral kinship. Schak (1991:1) has shown empirically for Taiwan that "in urban areas, Chinese kinship behavior--as distinct from kinship ideology--is better described as bilateral rather than patrilineal." The shift from an agricultural to an urban-industrial society has led to a greater reliance on and interaction with a man's affines (relations through his wife) and female consanguines

(married sisters). rather than primarily relatives within the agnatic core of his patrilineage.

Some China scholars suggest that even before the modern period, upper income people who could gain economic, social or political advantage from their equally well-off affines or other non-patrilateral relatives tried to do so. What is happening now in Taipei is that many more people are generally much more involved and active in Taipei's broader economic life than earlier. Now, instead of only the wealthy being more broadly involved with all kinds of diverse kin, including affines and other non-patrilateral kin, increasingly, many ordinary Taiwanese are aware of and utilize the benefits to be derived from these broader kin ties.

There are several reasons for this. When moving to Taipei, it may be the wife's kin who already live there and can provide help. Even if kin on both sides live in Taipei, new migrants can have a greater range of kin resources to tap than if they use only patrilateral kin. In a question not covered in this paper, we found a significant decline between 1963 and 1991 in the per cent of our Taipei respondents who thought it is important to have a male heir to transmit the lineage (*fu-tse chuan tsung chieh tai*). Son preference has apparently declined in urban Taiwan. People recognize that daughters tend to keep closer kin ties than sons. Keeping in contact with one's mother's, wife's and married daughters' sides of the family is now seen in Taipei as at least as important as contacts with the patriline. The result is that the meaningful and effective range of kin with whom one can, on a more or less voluntary basis, interact has expanded. For these reasons, it is understandable that the actual rate of interaction with extended kin, even in modernized Taipei, has significantly increased over the last generation.

Table 1. Kinship Solidarity: Norms Concerning Obligations To Kin in 1963 and 1991, Taipei Sample

	<u>%</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>%</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Tau-c</u>	<u>Phi</u>
1. Children have obligations to kin other than parents	52.1	48.4		.04
2. Children have obligations to "all" or "most" kin (rather than to "few" or "no kin")	38.7	30.1	-.04	
3. Specific obligations to kin				
A. Spontaneously mentioned (open-ended)				
1. Non-economic aid, e.g., help with chores at home	23.5	20.7		.03
2. Economic aid	8.5	8.6		.00
3. Respect	7.1	9.5		.04
4. Emotional harmony	5.5	9.4		.07*
5. Maintain close social contact	4.7	7.3		.05
6. Other obligations	2.8	1.5		.05
7. Same obligations as to parents	2.6	1.1		.05
B. Pre-coded obligations				
1. Maintain close, intimate relationships	93.1	42.0		.54**
2. Respect	91.9	46.6		.49**
3. Obedience	66.7	20.9		.46**
4. Economic aid	51.9	16.1		.39**
5. Help them at work & at home	46.5	20.9		.27**
6. Same obligations as to parents	45.2	18.0		.29**
7. Other obligations	20.7	0.002		.34**
N on which percentages are computed	507	545		

Responses to parts A and B are based on questions to which multiple responses could be given, and the percents in part B sum to more than 100%.

*p < .05 **p < .01

Table 2. Kinship Solidarity: Aspects of Behavior in 1963 and 1991, Ranked by Per Cent Solidarity in Taipei Sample in 1963

	<u>%</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>%</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Tau-c</u>	<u>Phi</u>
I have a high level of contact (visiting back and forth) with kin in village or small town where I once lived	68.4	69.3	.03	
Attended marriage ceremony with kin during previous year	62.7	71.6		.09**
Attended festival (<u>pai pai</u>) with kin during previous year	62.7	47.9		.15**
Attended New Year's celebration with kin during previous year	56.3	77.4		.23**
Attended funeral with kin during previous year	40.5	53.9		.13**
Attended ancestor worship ceremony with kin during previous year	39.2	75.0		.36**
Attended child birth ceremony with kin during previous year	34.1	30.1		.04
Attended birthday celebration with kin during previous year	32.6	44.4		.12**
Attended gatherings with kin five or more times during previous year	43.9	58.9	.20**	
Attended four or more types of gatherings with kin during previous year	39.1	61.9	.28**	
I have relied on kin in getting a job or promotion	9.6	17.5		.11**

** p < .01

Base N's are 507 for 1963 and 545 for 1991 for all items except the first, where base N (263 in 1963, 339 in 1991) refers to those Taipei residents who have lived in a village or small town.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- ADAMS, BERT N. 1968. *Kinship in an Urban Setting*. Chicago: Markham Publishing.
- BARRETT, RICHARD E., 1989. "The Changing Status of Women in Taiwan," 463-92, in *Taiwan, A Newly Industrialized State*. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Wei-yuan Cheng and Hou-sheng Chan, eds. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.
- CHINA POST. 1963. "Thousands Jam Taipei Streets to Attend Huge Pai Pai Dinners," (July 4).
- COHEN, MYRON L., 1969. "Agnatic Kinship in South Taiwan," 167-82, in *Ethnology* 8.2 (April).
- _____. 1970. "Developmental Process in the Chinese Domestic Group," 21-36, in *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*, Maurice Freedman, ed. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- _____. 1990. "Lineage Organization in North China," 509-534, in *The Journal of Asian Studies* 49.3 (August).
- Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 1980. *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China*, Taipei.
- DURKHEIM, EMILE, 1895. *The Rules of Sociological Method*. New York: The Free Press (1964).
- FREEDMAN, MAURICE, 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: University of London, Athlone Press.
- _____. 1961-62. "The Family in China, Past and Present," 323-36, in *Pacific Affairs* 34.4 (Winter).
- _____. 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. New York: Humanities Press.
- GALLIN, BERNARD, 1978. "Rural to Urban Migration in Taiwan: Its Impact on Chinese Family and Kinship," 261-82 in *Chinese Family Law and Social Change in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, ed. David C. Buxbaum. Seattle WA: University of Washington Press.
- _____. 1985. "Development and Change in Taiwan and Hong Kong," 47-64 in *The Future of Hong Kong and Taiwan*, ed. Jack F. Williams. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University.
- GOODE, WILLIAM J., 1963. *World Revolution and Family Patterns*. New York: Free Press.
- _____. 1982. *The Family*. (2nd Edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- GOODKIND, DANIEL M., 1991. "Creating New Traditions in Modern Chinese Populations: Aiming for Birth in the Year of the Dragon," 663-686, in *Population and Development Review* 17.4 (December).

GREENHALGH, SUSAN. 1984. "Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society in Taiwan," 529-52, in *The China Quarterly* 99.

HARRELL, STEVAN,. 1982. *Ploughshare Village: Culture and Context in Taiwan*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

HUBER, JOAN and GLENNA SPITZE. 1988. "Trends in Family Sociology," 425-48, in *Handbook of Sociology*, Neil J. Smelser, ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

LASLETT, PETER. 1965. *The World We have Lost*. London: Methuen.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. 1943. "The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States," 22-38, in *American Anthropologist* 45.

SCHAK, DAVID C., 1991. "Bilaterality in Urban Chinese Kinship Patterns: A Taiwan Case Study." Unpublished manuscript.

SUENARI, MICHIO, 1986. "Lineages in Taiwan and Korea: A Case Study of Controlled Comparison with Variation," paper presented at the Second International Conference on Sinology, Academia Sinica (December) 29-31.

WHYTE, MARTIN KING, and WILLIAM L. PARISH. 1984. *Urban Life in Contemporary China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

FOOTNOTES

1. Because Harrell's village was composed of wage laborers rather than peasants, its kinship patterns may be atypical of other Taiwan villages, but more comparable to the wage- and salary-earning population of Taipei.

2. Given the intended sample N of approximately 500 in 1963 and between 500 and 600 in 1991, the ratio of the number of households drawn for the sample to the number in which interviews were completed was much higher in 1991 (1,282/545) than in 1963 (642/507). The response rate was lower in 1991 not because of a higher rate of contacted household heads who refused to be interviewed, but due to the higher rate of households not at home and who could not be contacted for an interview in 1991. The higher ratio of households in the sample to completed interviews was deliberate, because we anticipated the "not at home" problem to be greater in 1991 than in 1963.

3. Families may go through a cycle of growth from the nuclear form to the stem form and even to the joint form before dividing the family property and starting the cycle all over again (Cohen 1970). Although the individual may live in different forms of households over the life course, it is nevertheless worth knowing the distribution of household types at any given point in time. That a person may live for some part of his or her life in a stem or joint family household does not alter the fact that most households in Taipei at a given time are nuclear.

4. Phi and tau-c are used as measures of statistical association between variables. Both vary between .00 and 1.00, with higher magnitudes indicating a greater difference between the 1963 and 1991 distributions of a given variable. The two ** after the association indicate that the difference between 1963 and 1991 in the per cent living in nuclear family households is significant at the .01 level. One * indicates that the phi or tau-c relationship is significant at the .05 level.

5. The interview schedule asked what obligations *children (tzu-nu)* have toward kin. Since some obligations imply those expected of *adult* children--e.g., give economic aid to kin--we shall use the more inclusive term, *people*, rather than *children*.

6. Because kinship ties to parents may be quite different from those to other extended kin, we are planning a separate paper on behavior, norms and attitudes toward parents in the 1963 and 1991 samples.

7. The explanations and interpretations we offer for changes in this and subsequent aspects of kinship behavior are based on the fact that one of the authors was born in Taiwan and has spent most of his life there. He draws on his personal experience in Taiwan and especially in Taipei, and both authors draw on relevant scholarly publications. Respondents were not asked in the interview situation *why* they did or did not gather with extended kin for *pai-pai* and other occasions.