

the ongoing changes that are taking place; but on the other hand, they could also be interpreted as a way for Beijing to use its economic clout to demonstrate to the Myanmar government that China can play a crucial role in the economic construction of the country. Certainly, the lack of matching investment from the West highlights to the Myanmar government that it is not wise to push Beijing too far. Bordering the second largest economy in the world, Myanmar will find it extremely difficult to divorce itself from its interdependence with China; ongoing economic problems in the West certainly hamper its capacity to offset this economic interdependence no matter how much they might aspire to do so.

Fundamentally, the advantage enjoyed by Beijing due to its superior economic condition relative to Myanmar is proving most important locally in ethnic minority areas along the border. The economic disparity between the two sides across the border is apparent to any casual observer and the current significance of this in the rise of contemporary Kachin ethno-nationalism and Jingpo interventions in recent events is discussed more fully in the following chapter by Ho Ts'ui-p'ing. The economic dynamism seen in China has been a constantly attractive force in recent years, pulling people along the border closer into the Chinese social and economic orbit. Despite the fact that Yunnan province is not one of the economic powerhouse provinces in China, it is still leaps ahead of Myanmar. Without the economic clout to attract people in the border regions, the Myanmar government can only rely increasingly on political and military coercion, which further alienates the border ethnic groups. With Beijing now more suspicious of Myanmar's strategic orientation, the potential value of the border region as a buffer has increased. The future of genuine national integration seems still to be very distant.

CHAPTER SEVEN

## *People's Diplomacy and Borderland History through the Chinese Jingpo Manau Zumko Festival*


Ho Ts'ui-p'ing

### **Background: Jingpo reflections on recent Kachin events**

The Jingpo of Yunnan are ethnic kin of the Kachin of Myanmar.<sup>1</sup> On 10 January 2013, a demonstration involving over 1,000 Jingpo nationals from the People's Republic of China (PRC) gathered at the Nabang Township border checkpoint on the PRC side of the Myanmar/PRC border, just 100 meters from Laiza. 10 January is Kachin State Day in Myanmar, marking the founding of the Kachin State following the independence of Burma from the British in 1948. Towards the end of 2012, the Myanmar air force had bombed Laiza and three bombs landed within Nabang Township in Yingjiang County.<sup>2</sup> The incident attracted much media interest in China and these attacks, in combination with the local protests that followed, compelled the PRC government to become more directly involved in events across the border and to take a more pro-active role in the renewed peace process between the KIA and the Myanmar Army.

China has been unable to avoid the fallout from conflicts arising across its borders but the direct involvement of the PRC in this stage of the peace process was an uneasy experience for many Myanmar, Kachin

1. The main sub-group of the Kachin people in Myanmar are the Jinghpaw. Jingpo is a variation of this term, although it is a multi-group nationality identity in China, just as Kachin is in Myanmar. The main sub-group of the Jingpo are Zaiwa.
2. Minnie Chan, 'China Makes Formal Complaint to Myanmar over Bombing Raids', *South China Morning Post* (5 January 2013), <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1120200/china-makes-formal-complaint-myanmar-over-bombing-raids>.



Map 7.1: Manau sites located in Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture

Source: Based on a redrawing by Huang Wanyu, from Yunnan Provincial Institute of Design Engineering (Yunnan Sheng Cehui Gongchengyuan 雲南省測繪工程院), ed. 2014. *Tourism Map of Yunnan* (Yunnan Lüyou Ditu 雲南旅遊地圖). Kunming: Yunnan keji chubanshe.

and international participants. When the ceasefire first collapsed in June 2011, it resulted in a flood of refugees crossing the PRC border into Ruili City and the counties of Longchuan and Yingjiang.<sup>3</sup> Abiding by its diplomatic principle of non-interference, the PRC sent the refugees back to Myanmar in August 2012.<sup>4</sup> However, when shells fell within Nabang Township and following the protests by PRC Jingpo people, the PRC was in many respects forced to try to mediate between the Kachin military forces and the Myanmar government. Initially the PRC turned to a PRC Jingpo official to represent their concerns. However, by 11 March 2013 they had decided instead to rely mainly on their own special envoy, Wang Yingfan, to represent PRC official interests in the process. Wang Yingfan was soon accused of strong-arm tactics by the Kachin side, but the confirmation of PRC involvement in this process meant that the PRC Jingpo became increasingly interested in expressing their own concerns and opinions about the war, the dilemma of the Kachin, and the relationship between the PRC Jingpo and the Kachin in Myanmar. By lifting their own self-censorship on these matters following the airstrikes, the PRC Jingpo in this way inserted themselves directly in the diplomatic triangle between officials of the PRC, Myanmar and the Kachin. The Jingpo elites I mention in this chapter, anonymous or otherwise, intended that their involvement should influence the Chinese government in its treatment of Kachin issues, but they also hoped to make the Myanmar government more cautious in its dealings with the Kachin as well.

The statements of support given to the Kachin on 10 January 2013 also prompted introspection by Jingpo elites on the PRC side of the border. Questions were raised about what it meant to be Jingpo as distinct

3. See the 2012 Chinese language article Tianya Huwai 天涯戶外, 'Miandian Bawan Nanmin Yong Xiang Zhong Mian Bianjing 緬甸8萬難民湧向中緬邊境 [Eighty Thousand Refugees from Burma Flood the China-Burma Borderland]' (12 March 2012), <http://bbs.outdoors.com.cn/read.php?tid=318663&uid=8&ds=1&toread=1>. Accessed 1 November 2014.
4. The BBC Chinese language service website reports that the Chinese government forced refugees to return to Myanmar. BBC Chinese, 'Zhongguo Bei Zhi Qiangpo Keqin Zu Nanmin Fanhui Miandian 中國被指強迫克欽族難民返回緬甸 [The Chinese Government Forces Refugees to Return to Myanmar]' (2012), [http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/chinese\\_news/2012/08/120824\\_china\\_kachin\\_refugees.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2012/08/120824_china_kachin_refugees.shtml).

from Kachin, especially in the context of the Chinese-ness of Jingpo society. During the ceasefire, the capacity to move more easily across the border had been an advantage and this had encouraged self-reflection and comparison on both sides, as noted also by Enze Han in this volume. Rethinking the meanings of Jingpo Chinese-ness among the Jingpo themselves had also been influenced by changes in China's political and economic life during this same period. These questions had been raised more openly about a decade earlier, following what were called the 'roots-seeking trips' undertaken by the Jingpo official and intellectual Li Xiangqian (or Htoi Man), which began in 2002. Li initiated these trips when he was a member of the Dehong Prefectural Committee of the CPC (Communist Party of China)<sup>5</sup> and he subsequently went on to suggest that all Jingpo outside of China should be considered 'historically overseas Chinese' (*lishi qiaomin* 歷史僑民).<sup>6</sup> Yet following the return to conflict in 2011 and the bombings of 2012, the need for reflection on these relationships was again heightened and given new significance. One outcome of these reflections was the decision to hold an International Scholarly Conference on the Jingpo Nationality (*Jingpozu guojixueshu jiaoliu dahui* 景頗族國際學術交流大會) in February 2014.<sup>7</sup> This event was held in Ruili City on the PRC–Myanmar border, which had been a site for ceasefire talks on 4 February 2013 and then again on 11 March 2013.<sup>8</sup> At the conference, the PRC Jingpo researcher Doshi Yong Htang

5. Zhang Jianzhang 張建章, *Jingpo Xun Gen* 景頗尋根 [The Search for Roots Among the Jingpo Nationality] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong Minzu Chubanshe, 2006).

6. 17 September 2014 interview.

7. Conference co-organizers included the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, the Nationality Research Association of the University of Yunnan Nationalities, the Ruili City Cultural Communication Institute of the China–Myanmar Borderland, and the Ruili City Manau Zumko Organizing Committee.

8. Zhongguo pinglun xinwenwang 中國評論新聞網 [China Review News], 'Chongtu Chuxian Zhuanji, Miandian Chongtu Shuangfang Zai Yunnan Ruili Hetan 衝突出現轉機，緬甸衝突雙方在雲南瑞麗和談 [A Turning Point Appears: The Two Sides to the Myanmar Conflict Will Hold Peace Talks in Ruili, Yunnan]' (2013), <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1024/2/9/5/102429592.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102429592>. Accessed 27 May 2013. People's Republic of China 中國外交部 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Waijiao Bu Fayaren Jiu Mian Zhengfu Yu Keqin Duli Zuzhi Huitan Deng Da Wen 外交部發言人就緬政府與克欽獨立組織會談等答問 [The Foreign Affairs Department Spokesperson Answers Questions About Talks Between the Myanmar Government and the

again raised the subject of the 'Chinese-ness' of the Jingpo/Kachin and suggested that, since their ancestral homeland is in China, all Kachin/Jingpo who are not PRC citizens are 'overseas Chinese' (*huaqiao* 華僑).<sup>9</sup> The comment reflected concerns about their Kachin relatives living across the border in Myanmar but was undoubtedly also an extension of the broader ongoing discussion of the Chinese-ness of the PRC Jingpo.

Significantly, the conference was held in conjunction with a manau dance festival. Any observer of this region will know that the manau has become an important cultural symbol of the Kachin and the Jingpo in their respective states, as well as of the related kin groups called Singpho in India and in diaspora communities globally. The manau was traditionally 'a great *nat*-feast and religious dance, supposed to be of supernatural origin.'<sup>10</sup> Sacrifice for the *nat* or autochthonous spirits, ritual chanting, and people's dancing were crucial to the ritual. With the restoration of manau activities in 1980 in China, the manau festival was reconfigured as an icon of the Jingpo nationality. Today, there is no ritual chanting, no sacrificing to the *nat* in public except, since the mid-2000s, for the sake of tourism. To most of those attending, including the Jingpo, the manau is a big dance party with thousands of people participating together to upbeat music. This dance festival has been an important point of mutual recognition between Jingpo and Kachin communities in recent years, especially during the ceasefire, but it has also been important since the resumption of fighting. Understanding the dynamics of this trans-border connection and recognition through the medium of the manau, and

KIA]' (2013), [http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/xwfb/2013-02/05/content\\_2327635.htm](http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/xwfb/2013-02/05/content_2327635.htm). Accessed 27 May 2013.

9. Doqshi Yong Htang (Doshi Yongtang) 朵示擁湯, 'Shijie Jingpo Ren De Zuji Shi Zhongguo 世界景頗人的祖籍是中國 [The Ancestral Homeland of the Jingpo People All Over the World Is China]' (paper presented at the Jingpozu guoji xueshu jiaoliu da hui 景頗族國際學術交流大會 [International Conference on the Jingpo Nationality], Ruili, Yunnan, 20–23 February 2014). Doqshi's paper is bilingual in Chinese and Jingpo. The Jingpo language version title is '*Mung kan wunpong myusha ni a jiwoi mungdan*', which translates into English as 'The Ancestral Homeland of the Wunpong [the indigenous term for all Kachin] All Over the World: The Chinese language title is the more assertive 世界景頗人的祖籍是中國, meaning 'China is the Ancestral Homeland for the Jingpo from All Over the World'.

10. Ola Hanson, *A Dictionary of the Kachin Language* (Rangoon: American Baptist Mission Press, 1906).



how Jingpo elites have used this festival to make interventions in China's diplomacy over recent events, will be the main focus of this chapter.

Following the resumption of conflict in June 2011, it was not possible to hold large festivals in the Kachin capital of Myitkyina, even though during the ceasefire the manau festival had become notable as an annual event of considerable scale. Holding a large manau in the border town of Ruili on this occasion, therefore, served to highlight that situation in Myitkyina. To hold the conference and manau festival in this location was an important and newly assertive way of making the involvement of PRC Jingpo in cross-border political affairs more public. Previous expressions of cross-border support had been more subtle than the direct protests of 2013, but they, too, had utilized the manau. For example, at the 2012 International Manau Zumko Festival held in Mangshi following the return to conflict in the Kachin region, two dances were performed which were called respectively a '10,000 people's dance' and a 'one thousand people's dance with knives'. Ostensibly, this was an effort to be registered as a Guinness World Record and representatives from the organization were invited to attend. The holding of knives while dancing the manau, however, was traditionally seen at a *Padang Manau*, sometimes translated as a Victory Manau: holding knives before, during or after a time of warfare was considered to be a display of martial courage. A major padang manau had been held in Myitkyina as part of the victory celebrations after World War II, for example, and one of the most recent was that held in Sadung in 1994 to mark the ceasefire agreement between the KIA and Tatmadaw, which will be referred to again later in this chapter. While the symbolism of the event at Mangshi in 2012 may have meant different things for the authorities in China and Myanmar, for the Kachin in Myanmar and in the diaspora, who observed knowingly this act of martial and moral support from their kin in China, it carried a special meaning as the renewed conflict in Myanmar became deadlocked.<sup>11</sup>

Increasing cross-border connections between the Kachin and the Jingpo had developed before the 1994 ceasefire, occurring from the early 1980s onwards after the launch in 1978 of the PRC economic reform policy (*gaige kaifang* 改革開放). Since the renewal of the Jingpo

11. I thank Mandy Sadan for her insights on the impact on Kachin knife symbolism arising from the recent interactions with the Tatmadaw.

manau as a festival in the PRC in 1980, the linguistic, cultural and social affinities between these communities have been indispensable in ensuring and consolidating mutual recognition, regardless of the political and economic differences between the PRC Jingpo and the Myanmar Kachin. While the significance of the manau on the Kachin side and its relationship to Kachin ethno-nationalism has been explored in some detail,<sup>12</sup> this chapter expands on that understanding by showing the mutually inflected histories of the Chinese Jingpo manau festival with that of the Kachin. I explore the effects of the Jingpo manau zumko festival in the People's Republic of China as a key link in a wider effort at joining in the state 'diplomacy' between China, Myanmar and Kachin. I argue that we need to develop a fuller understanding of the festival so as to comprehend the range of alternative histories at this borderland for the period from 1980 until the present. In addition, the diplomacy of the Chinese Jingpo at manau festivals is a recent version of 'people's diplomacy' in the PRC and it is relevant if we want a fuller understanding of the wider context of diplomatic efforts to ease tensions between the then-military government of Myanmar and the Kachin.

### Political and economic relations in the Dehong borderland since the 1980s

One of the most important issues arising between the Kachin and the Jingpo, referred to also by Enze Han in this volume, is the changing perception of development and living standards on both sides of the border. These perceptions have changed markedly since the 1980s, when changes were driven more obviously by the new economic policies emerging within Myanmar and China rather than by specifically local issues. The Myanmar scholar Khine Tun describes the politico-economic relationship between the PRC and Myanmar between the late 1980s and mid-2000 as 'strategic' and 'bilateral'.<sup>13</sup> As early as 1980, the border county of Yingjiang in the Dehong Jingpo and Dai Nationality Autonomous Prefecture re-

12. Mandy Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma* (Oxford: The British Academy and Oxford University Press, 2013), 406–54.

13. Khine Tun, 'China–Myanmar: Towards More Balanced and Better Neighborhood', in *Impact of China's Rise on the Mekong Region*, ed. Yos Santasombat (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 176.



sumed small-scale border trade with Burma.<sup>14</sup> Then in 1985, the Dehong government announced its status as a 'border trade region' (*bianjing maoyi qu* 邊境貿易區) and that it was opening it up to both domestic and international business.<sup>15</sup> Cross-border trade agreements between the PRC and Myanmar followed, which were signed in 1988. In addition, the PRC withdrew its support of the Burmese communists, who were located along the PRC/Myanmar border, and became the only country to provide economic aid to the new Myanmar military government.

In China, there were other national interests that influenced responses to the border region. Concerns with environmental damage caused by resource extraction were important in these early interactions, but these concerns became more acute on the China side in the late 1990s. In response to the devastating 1998 Yangtze River floods, the PRC government initiated the Natural Forest Protection Program, including such measures as converting the degraded farmland into forest and grassland, and promoting methane-generating pits and fuel-saving stoves.<sup>16</sup> Special emphasis was given to the ban on logging and the mobilization of farmers for reforestation.<sup>17</sup> Related to this, and to help

14. Yingjiangxian zhibianzuan weiyuanhui 盈江縣誌編纂委員會 (YJXZBZWYH) [Compilation Committee of the Yingjiang County Gazetteer], ed., *Yingjiang Xian Zhi* 盈江縣誌 [Yingjiang County Gazetteer] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 280.
15. Yunnansheng Ruilishi zhibianzuan weiyuanhui 雲南省瑞麗市誌編纂委員會 (YNSRLSZBZWYH) [Compilation Committee of the Ruili City Gazetteer], ed., *Ruili Xian Zhi* 瑞麗市誌 [Gazetteer of Ruili City] (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1996), 65. Dangdai Yunnan Jingpozu jianshi bianji weiyuanhui 當代雲南景頗族簡史編輯委員會 (DDYNJPZJSBJWYH) [The Editorial Committee for A Brief History of the Contemporary Yunnan Jingpo Nationality], ed., *Dangdai Yunnan Jingpozu Jianshi* 當代雲南景頗族簡史 [A Brief History of the Contemporary Yunnan Jingpo Nationality] (Kunming: Renmin chubanshe, 2010), 114.
16. Communist Party of China, '中共中央、國務院關於災後重建、整治江湖、興修水利的若干意見' opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Post-Disasters' Rebuilds, Rivers and Lakes' Remediation, and Water Conservancy' (1998), <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66688/4494418.html>. Accessed 17 February 2015.
17. Andrew Wilson, 'Forest Conversion and Land Use Change in Rural Northwest Yunnan, China: A Fine-Scale Analysis in the Context of the "Big Picture"', *Mountain Research and Development* 26, no. 3 (2006), 229. Janet Sturgeon,

the PRC's efforts to join the World Trade Organization, which it did in 2001, the central government began to increase public awareness about environmental issues. The government initiated its environmentally pitched Green Industry Policy to promote the development of rubber, tea, and fruit plantations, as well as tourism.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, the response of the lumber companies to the Natural Forest Protection Program was to move their logging operations into neighbouring countries, as was also discussed by Kevin Woods, earlier in this volume.

However, much stronger economic influences undermined efforts at environmental safeguarding in this region. In an effort to narrow the gap in living standards between the west and the east of the PRC, the central government announced early in 2000 its policy of 'opening up the west' (*xibu dakaiifa* 西部大開發). Several agreements for mega-projects, including hydropower, oil and natural gas and mining were signed off in northern Myanmar between the PRC and the military regime.<sup>19</sup> This period, therefore, which coincides with the Kachin ceasefire, involved the emergence of an unbalanced cross-border economic relationship that involved dramatic growth in PRC/Myanmar bilateral cross-border trade and massive PRC investment in Myanmar.<sup>20</sup>

The effects of the rapid expansion of cross-border economic activities since the early 1990s, therefore, fell heavily on the PRC/Myanmar borderland. Kevin Woods states that before the ceasefire the KIO/KIA was financing itself through its monopoly of the Burma-China jadeite

'Quality Control: Resource Access and Local Village Elections in Rural China', *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009), 494–95.

18. Liu Wenjun *et al.*, 'Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of Increasing Rubber Plantations in Menglun Township, Southwest China', *Mountain Research and Development* 26, no. 3 (2006), 251.
19. KDNG (Kachin Development Networking Group), 'Damming the Irrawaddy' (October 2007); KDNG (Kachin Development Networking Group), 'Valley of Darkness: Gold Mining and Militarisation in Burma's Hugawng Valley' (2007); KDNG (Kachin Development Networking Group), 'Lessons from the Kachin "Development" Experience' (2012), <http://www.kdng.org/images/stories/publication/lessons%20from%20the%20kachin%20development%20experience%20longer%20paper.2.pdf>.
20. Khine Tun, 'China-Myanmar: Towards More Balanced and Better Neighborhood', 176–181.

trade.<sup>21</sup> However, Woods asserts that after the ceasefire these relationships could be encapsulated by the phrase 'ceasefire capitalism', an idea upon which he has expanded in his chapter in this volume. Woods argues that from 1994 to 2011 'ceasefire capitalism' constituted a period of 'military-state building' in the Burma–China borderland.<sup>22</sup> Initially, the ceasefire period was also characterized by complicity on the part of many Kachin elites in these developments. Progressively during the ceasefire, however, the Myanmar military-state expanded its rule over land and people in the contested ethnic territories. This occurred 'through the daily actions of a conglomeration of actors, such as state land agency workers, surveyors, regional military officers, local pro-government militia leaders, as well as state-like actors, such as businessmen, ethnic elite leaders and non-government organizations (NGOs)'.<sup>23</sup> An additional dimension that Woods notes was the military-state's policy to 'allocate resource concessions to Chinese investors'.<sup>24</sup>

People living along the PRC/Myanmar border in Yingjiang and Longchuan counties in Dehong confirmed to me much of Woods' characterization of pre-2004 cross-border trade. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, some borderland Jingpo went to Hpakan, the center of jadeite mining in the Kachin State, just as Hkanhpa Sadan describes doing in a later chapter. Many other Kachin people acted as intermediaries in the jade trade in Dehong Prefecture. From the beginning of the ceasefire in 1994 to about 2005, several Jingpo from Yingjiang made their own fortunes by acting as intermediaries for logging operations in the Kachin hills. However, in 2006 a bilateral agreement signed by Myanmar and the PRC to stop the 'illegal' cross-border timber trade effectively contributed to 'the Burmese nationalization of Kachin forest resources' and disrupted 'the cross-border timber trade controlled by the Kachin business elite and Kachin traders'.<sup>25</sup>

21. Kevin Woods, 'Ceasefire Capitalism: Military-Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38, no. 4 (2011), 750.

22. Ibid. 748.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid. 749.

25. Ibid. 756.

Reports from many NGOs repeatedly confirm that 'ceasefire capitalism' in the borderland Kachin State created serious problems with deforestation,<sup>26</sup> contamination by over-mining,<sup>27</sup> forced population displacement, trafficking of women and other human rights abuses, along with serious drug and AIDS problems.<sup>28</sup> In contrast, except for the PRC government's acknowledgement of social problems relating to drugs and AIDS,<sup>29</sup> little has been reported on social problems arising on

26. Fredrich Kahrl *et al.*, 'Navigating the Border: An Analysis of the China – Myanmar Timber Trade', (2004), [http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc\\_120.pdf](http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_120.pdf). Fredrich Kahrl, Horst Weyerhaeuser and Yufang Su, 'An Overview of the Market Chain for China's Timber Product Imports from Myanmar' (2005), <http://www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/Publications/files/book/BK0079-05.pdf>. Global Witness, *A Disharmonious Trade: China and the Continued Destruction of Burma's Northern Frontier Forests* (Global Witness, 2009 [cited 12th May 2012]); available from <http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/environment/forests/illegal-logging/burma>; Kevin Woods, 'Rubber Planting and Military-State Making: Military-Private Partnerships in Northern Burma', *New Mandala*, (2011), <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/02/04/rubber-planting-and-military-state-making-military-private-partnerships-in-northern-burma/>. PKDS (Pan Kachin Development Society) & KESAN (Karen Environmental and Social Action Network), 'Destruction and Degradation of the Burmese Frontier Forests: Listening to the People's Voices' (2004).

27. PKDS (Pan Kachin Development Society) & Images Asia, 'At What Price? Gold Mining in Kachin State, Burma' (2004).

28. KDNG (Kachin Development Networking Group), 'Lessons from the Kachin 'Development' Experience' (2012), <http://www.kdng.org/images/stories/publication/lessons%20from%20the%20kachin%20development%20experience%20longer%20paper.2.pdf>. Andrew R. C Marshall and Min Zayar Oo, 'Myanmar Old Guard Clings to \$8-Billion Jade Empire', *Globe and Mail* (4 October 2013); Patrick Winn, 'Myanmar: Hell Hath No Fury Like Hpakan' (2014), <http://www.minnpost.com/global-post/2014/01/myanmar-hell-hath-no-fury-hpakan#U7VA2PEXXXw.email>.

29. Jin Liyan 金黎燕, 'Dupin Dui Jingpozu De Weihai Ji Qi Yuanyin Fenxi 毒品對景頗族的危害及其原因分析 [The Damage of Drugs to the Jingpo Nationality and an Analysis of Its Causes]', *Jinpo zu yanjiu 景頗族研究 [Jingpo Nationality Studies]* 1 (2008). Juan Du 杜娟 Jin Liyan 金黎燕 Weng Naqun 翁乃群, Hou Hongrui 侯紅蕊, 'Hailuoyin, Xing, Xieyi Ji Qi Zhipin De Liudong Yu Aizibing, Xingbing De Chuanbo 海洛因、性、血液及其制品的流動與艾滋病、性病的傳播 [The Flow of Heroin, Sex, and Blood and Its Products and the Transmission of Venereal Disease and Aids]', *Minzu yanjiu 民族研究 [Ethno-National Studies]* 6, no. 40–49 (2004). Weng Naqun 翁乃群, 'Flows of Heroin, People, Capital, Imagination, and the Spread of HIV in Southwest China', in

the Dehong side of the PRC/Myanmar border. Yue Pinrong describes the dissolution of Jingpo village communities in the PRC because of poverty, dispossession of land and forests, poor land management in general, cash cropping, drugs, and weak leadership. Many of these issues resonate with the situation described by Reshmi Bannerjee in north-east India in this volume, too, although very different outcomes from these processes are also evident.<sup>30</sup> However, as serious as the conditions he describes for the PRC Jingpo may be, the contrast between conditions in Myanmar and Dehong Prefecture still appeared striking to many local residents and international observers. These markedly distinct local development histories for the Jingpo and the Kachin, favourable to the PRC, even acquired some official recognition on the Dehong side of the border. In an official volume entitled *A Short History of the Contemporary Yunnan Jingpo Nationality* published in November 2010, recent PRC Jingpo history is divided into two periods: the first period, from 1979 to 2000, was the 'new socialist era'; the second period, from 2000 to 2008, was that of 'building a well-rounded moderately pros-

---

*Translocal China: Linkages, Identities, and the Reimagining of Space*, ed. Tim Oakes and Louisa Schein (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Fu Guosheng 傅果生, 'Shi "Shen" De Shequ Jiqi Congjian Zhi Dao 失「神」的社區及其重建之道 [A Community That Lost Its Faith and How to Rebuild It]' (Master thesis, Zhongyang minzu daxue minzuxue yanjiusuo 中央民族大學民族學研究所 [Institute of Ethnology, Minzu University of China], 2006). Chen Deshou 陳德壽, 'Jinmubu He Ta De Funu Jindu Lianfangdui 金木布和她的婦女禁毒聯防隊. In Shan De Jiliang: Zhongguo Jingpo Zu Xin Shehui Fazhan Bianqian Shi 山的脊梁：中國景頗族新社會發展變遷史 [Mountain Ridges: A History of Development and Change in the New Society of the Chinese Jingpo Nationality]', ed. Dehongzhou minzu zongjiao shiwuju 德宏州政協文史資料委員會、德宏州民族宗教事務局 [The Archival Committee on Nationalities Religious Affairs of the People's Political Consultative Committee in Dehong Prefecture] Dehongzhou zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (Kunming: Yunnan chubanshe, Yunnan meishu chubanshe, 2006).

30. Although Yue Pinrong makes no direct reference to particular communities or distributions, the following essay remains a rare account of current social conditions of the Jingpo: Yue Pinrong 岳品榮, 'Jingpozu Cunzhai Fazhan Tuihua Xianxiang Qianxi 景頗族村寨發展退化現象淺析 [A Tentative Analysis of a Reversal in Jingpo Nationality Village Development]', in *Jingpozu Yanjiu 景頗族研究* [Studies of the Jingpo Nationality. Volume 2], ed. Duo Shidang 奪石當編 (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2010).

perous society era'.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, the Kachin have described serious deforestation and its disastrous consequences on the Myanmar side of the border within the same period. For many observers, 2000–08 was perhaps the most critical period for the negative experience of 'ceasefire capitalism'. During this time especially, the sense of exploitation and the feeling of unrestrained environmental degradation by outside business interests was acute, as is described by many of the contributors to this book. These comparisons and contrasts, therefore, have had an impact on both sides of the border, influencing perceptions of each other and interpretations of the development potential in either state. The apparent grandeur of the Jingpo manau festival in Yunnan in recent years and the state support that has been given to its development is a visible marker of these different opportunities and outcomes for many Kachin people on the Myanmar side of the border. Comparing the ability of Kachin and Jingpo groups to stage manau festivals, and observing the cultural politics of these events, has been important in the development of cross-border relations between Kachin and Jingpo people. The manau, therefore, has been a particularly important point of reference for Kachin communities looking over the border into China. For many Kachin people during these years, the Jingpo manau was seen as something to emulate and made the manau festival itself a litmus test of the comparative condition of Kachin–Jingpo ethnic nationality politics in this borderland.

### The establishment of the Jingpo manau-zumko as a Jingpo nationality festival

Given the economic interests that have shaped higher-level relations between the Myanmar and Chinese governments, it might seem strange that a small minority nationality would have any significance in the diplomacy of these countries, especially in discussions about whether or not a ceasefire should be reinstated in the Kachin region. However, the fact that the Jingpo are considered a factor to be taken into considera-

- 
31. Dangdai Yunnan Jingpozu jianshi bianji weiyuanhui 當代雲南景頗族簡史編輯委員會 [The Editorial Committee for A Brief History of the Contemporary Yunnan Jingpo Nationality], ed. *Dangdai Yunnan Jingpozu Jianshi 當代雲南景頗族簡史* [A Brief History of the Contemporary Yunnan Jingpo Nationality] (Kunming: Renmin chubanshe, 2010), 96, 136.



tion in the PRC is to some extent due to the successful promotion of the manau in the cultural politics of Yunnan in recent decades, including the attempt by state authorities to co-opt the festival for their own political and economic interests. However, while the festival has been pushed and pulled in all directions,<sup>32</sup> the undeniable outcome is that the status and visibility of the Jingpo as a minority nationality of Yunnan has been strengthened as a result of developments around the manau in recent years. The ritual origins of the manau have been discussed in detail elsewhere and will not be repeated here.<sup>33</sup> This chapter will consider the main developments that have occurred since the late 1970s in Jingpo areas of the PRC and will outline how Kachin and Jingpo festivals have inflected each other since that time.

In 1978, with the easing of state controls over nationality customs, Jingpo people in the PRC/Myanmar border counties of Yingjiang, Ruili, Longchuan and Luxi began, on their own initiative, to organize small-scale manau activities. An important figure in these early developments was Zhangmo Nong, then the Director of the Bureau of Justice of Longchuan County. He led an initiative for 'Reforming and Innovating Manau Cultural Activity'. This proposal was discussed and refined by Jingpo elites and officials from Ruili, Yingjiang, and Luxi Counties. The proposal was finalized in 1979 and was then submitted at the party

32. A detailed analysis of the different manau performances and the local internal cultural politics of performance are beyond the scope of this chapter.

33. Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma*, 428–429. See also the related website, which details many images and recordings of manau festivals: Mandy Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Fieldwork Notes, Photographs, Translations* (2013) available from <http://mandysadan.weebly.com/>. For comparison, for the Jingpo manau news and photos of 2012 Mangshi manau, see *Kachin Life Stories*, <http://kachinlifestories.com/tag/world-jingpo-manau/>. Nicholas Farrelly, *New Mandala*, (2007), <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2007/05/04/what-a-manau-looks-like/> for the photos and illustrations taken by Farrelly at the 2007 Jingpo manau and a series of manau pictures and stories from the 2008–2011 Kachin manau in Myitkyina; Nicholas Farrelly, *New Mandala*, (2012), <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/01/10/10-january-war-and-manau/>. For 2015, see Kachinland News, 'Kachin Forced to Celebrate Manau Dance in Myitkyina', (2015), <http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=25286>.

level.<sup>34</sup> Zhangmo Nong told me in 1989 that he was motivated to initiate this proposal because of a deep-seated desire to create a Jingpo identity that contrasted with that of the Dai and Han nationalities in Yunnan. The practical intention of the proposal was that manau activities would help to create a distinctive Jingpo identity through the revival of traditional clothing, textiles, music, and dances, which had been eradicated or had otherwise fallen into disuse during the nationwide leftist movements prior to 1978.<sup>35</sup>

In the 'reformed' manau, especially during the early years of its development, there was an explicit effort to keep certain previously sensitive practices of traditional manau festivals, such as *nat* or autochthonous spirit worship, altogether out of or at most quietly and minimally present at the new events.<sup>36</sup> Another concern was the potential size of such

34. In Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川* [the Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 2005). The authors give a detailed account of how this proposal for reformed manau cultural activities was initiated and developed. It also gives anecdotal accounts of the anxieties of fellow initiators in awaiting state approval, and the gossip and suspicion about the proposal endured by some fellow Dehong residents (including some Jingpo) (ibid., 37–39; see also Yue Pinrong 岳品榮, *Jingpo Zu Munaozongge Lishi Wenhua 景頗族目瑙縱歌歷史文化* [History and Culture of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau Zumko] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 2009), 23–26.

35. Zhangmo Nong said in an interview with me in 1989 that during the leftist period all Jingpo languages and dialects were considered 'black languages' (*heihua* 黑話) and were banned, together with the 'Four Olds' of traditional and ethnic ideas, culture, customs and habits, especially indigenous clothing, dance, music and local folk practices (see also Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川* [the Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 112).

36. However, reports in other Jingpo areas in Dehong show people still practice *nat* worship for manau, especially in townships in Yingjiang county (see figure pages 1, 2, 12 and text pages 74, 75 in Shi Mumiao 石木苗 and Min Jianguo 閔建國, *Jingpozu Munao Tanyuan 景頗族目瑙探源* [The Origin Research of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2000). Yingjiangxian zhibianzuan weiyuanhui 盈江縣誌編纂委員會 (YJXZBZYH) [Compilation Committee of the Yingjiang County Gazetteer], ed. *Yingjiang Xian Zhi 盈江縣誌* [Yingjiang County Gazetteer], 47). There were Christian manau held locally in Ruili, too (Ruilishi Shizhi Bangongahi 瑞麗市史志辦公室 (RLSSZBGS) 編 [Gazetteer Office of Ruili County], ed. *Ruili Jingpo Zu 瑞麗景頗族* [the Jingpo

events. Traditionally, a successful manau was partly defined by the size of the gathering. There was a belief that the greater the numbers of participants, the greater the prosperity generated for the future. However, as is inevitable when living within any authoritarian regime, there were concerns that large-scale manau gatherings might be seen as a potential challenge to local authorities and a risk to state control. Nobody on the committees organizing the first state-approved manau performances really knew just how large a manau could be and still pass state scrutiny.

The first state-sanctioned Jingpo manau dance festival was held in Longchuan County in 1980. The Longchuan police estimated that it attracted a crowd of 66,000.<sup>37</sup> Significantly, too, Kachin people were invited from Myanmar to attend this first reformed manau dance festival on the PRC side of the border. Myanmar Kachin participants included representatives from Lashio, Mujie, Namhkam, Bhamo, Myitkyina and Mandalay. As in China, no events of such a large scale had been held in Kachin State since the post-World War II and independence celebrations. Not surprisingly perhaps, this expression of cultural and demographic assertiveness attracted attention.<sup>38</sup>

In 1981, Zhangmo Nong and others agreed unanimously to call this new manau *Jurong Wunpong Htung Hking Manau* (the customary manau of Jingpo compatriots from all over the world).<sup>39</sup> It was commonly also known as *manau zumko*, which combines the Jingpo term manau with

Nationality in Ruili] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 2014), 230. Shi and Min, *ibid.*, figures on page 33).

37. Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun* 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川 [The Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 41.

38. Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma*.

39. Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun* 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川 [the Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 40. *Wunpong* is a term of self-reference for Kachin in Myanmar. Mandy Sadan (2013 *ibid.*) gives a detailed delineation of the origin and the development of the word *wunpawng*. In my interview with him in March 1996, Zhangmo Nong explained the meaning of *wunpong*: that 'wun' means 'to be powerful', and 'pong' means 'to be united'. In his new book, Zhangmo Nong uses the phrase 'Jurong Bong Yong Jinghpo' rather than 'Jurong Wunpong' and explains how 'Bong Yong Jinghpo' is the origin ancestor for all the Langvo, Lachi, Rawang, Zaiwa and Jinghpo branches and is the best term of self-reference for all

the Zaiwa term *zumko*, reflecting that the Zaiwa are the largest group within the Jingpo nationality in Yunnan. With the beginning of economic liberalization, the central government announced in 1983 the decision to establish 'nationality festivals' for the various nationalities (*minzu jieri* 民族節日) and 'to create activities for "Nationalities Unity Month"' (*kaizhan minzu tuanjie yue huodong* 開展民族團結月活動) as passed by the Eighth People's Congress of Dehong Prefecture.<sup>40</sup> From that time forward, the Jingpo nationality festival of *manau zumko* has been held annually on the fifteenth of the first lunar month, usually lasting two days.<sup>41</sup> In 1988, the Yunnan provincial government began to realize that its 'minority nationalities' image was good for business and it seized upon the 'nationality festivals' to attract investment. However, with the need to develop the reformed manau to function as a Jingpo Nationality Festival, further transformation was needed. These developments also reveal some of the ongoing dynamics of interaction across the border

Jingpo (Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Naoshuang Shenyun* 瑙雙神韻 [the Charm of the Naushong] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 2007), 32–35.

40. Dehong Daizu Jingpozu zizhizhou gaiguang bianxiezou 德宏傣族景頗族自治州概況編寫組 (DHDZJPZZZZGKBXZ) [Compilation Section for General Accounts of the Dehong Dai Nationality and the Jingpo Nationality Autonomous Prefecture], ed. *Dehong Daizu Jingpozu Zizhizhou Gaiguang* 德宏傣族景頗族自治州概況 [General Accounts of the Dehong Dai Nationality and the Jingpo Nationality Autonomous Prefecture] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2008), 91. Initially, prefectural government funding for nationalities festivals was financed annually by a special budget (Liu Guicheng 劉貴成 and Shounan Wang 王壽南, 'Fazhan Shangpin Shengchan, Fanrong Bianjiang Jingji, Jiaqiang Minzu Tuanjie 發展商品生產, 繁榮邊疆經濟, 加強民族團結 [Developing the Production of Commodities, Making the Economy of the Borderland Prosperous, and Strengthening Nationality Solidarity]', in *Dehong Sishi Nian* 德宏四十年 [Forty Years in Dehong], ed. Dehong zhou shizhi bangongshi bian 德宏州史志辦公室 編 [Gazetteer Office of the Dehong Prefecture] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 79.

41. Zhangmo Nong writes about the preparations for the revival of the first large-scale manau with congratulatory groups from all over Dehong in 1980 in his bilingual Chinese-Jingpo monograph (Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Naoshuang Shenyun* 瑙雙神韻 [The Charm of the Naushong], 48–53.) See also his co-authored Chinese monograph Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun* 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川 [The Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 28–41)

with Kachin State during these years, when conflict was still live in the Kachin region.

### Jingpo manau and cross-border exchanges with the Kachin before the ceasefire

From 1980 to the mid-1990s and with state support, Jingpo elites – who were mostly government officials – were able to promote the performance of reformed manau dance festivals in many Jingpo townships and counties, and to normalize these activities in line with ‘the spirit of the new socialism’ in ‘modernization’ and ‘civilization’.<sup>42</sup> Many permanent manau sites were built with high concrete posts, which formed the central focus of the dance and the festival.<sup>43</sup>

Between 1980 and 1995, the stated intention of organizers of manau dance festivals was to build a distinctive identity for the Jingpo nationality through the public performance of the manau and its associated visible architecture. The building of permanent manau dance sites was significant for marking out a Jingpo spatial and cultural identity.<sup>44</sup> The permanent manau dance sites were also intended by some to create

42. Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu munao zhi xiang: Longchun 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川* [The Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 29–30, 41–52; Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Naoshuang Shenyun 瑙雙神韻* [The Charm of the Naushong], preface 3–4, pp. 6–7, 18, 37–38, 48–49; Yue Pinrong 岳品榮, *Jingpo Zu Munaozongge Lishi Wenhua 景頗族目瑙縱歌歷史文化* [History and Culture of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau Zumko], 37.

43. Shi Mumiao 石木苗 and Min Jianguo 閔建國, *Jingpozu Munao Tanyuan 景頗族目瑙探源* [The Origin Research of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau], 73–78. Yue's volume gives the chronologies of manau held at different levels of administration in Longchuan County (Yue Pinrong 岳品榮, *Jingpo Zu Munaozongge Lishi Wenhua 景頗族目瑙縱歌歷史文化* [History and Culture of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau Zumko], 33–35). *The Jingpo nationality in Ruili* provides a close chronology of Ruili City manau performances (Ruili Shi Shizhi bangongahi 瑞麗市史志辦公室 (RLSSZBGS) 編 [Gazetteer Office of Ruili County], ed., *Ruili Jingpo Zu 瑞麗景頗族* [the Jingpo Nationality in Ruili], 227–34.)

44. Shi Mumiao 石木苗 and Min Jianguo 閔建國, *Jingpozu Munao Tanyuan 景頗族目瑙探源* [The Origin Research of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau]. This gives pictures and drawings of many manau posts (made of wood, and made of concrete with steel structure) and valuable descriptions of manau post designs with dates specified.

physical correspondences with Dai and Han temples, which were seen as markers of high Dai and Han civilizations. In Lianghe County, the only county in Dehong prefecture with an indigenous Jingpo population that does not share a border with Myanmar, the 2,227 resident Jingpo (less than two per cent of the Jingpo population in Dehong prefecture) built their own permanent manau field in 1995.<sup>45</sup> Even the Jingpo people residing outside Dehong prefecture in Gengma town in the Lincang prefecture-level municipality constructed their own permanent manau field in 1993. At that time, the total population of Jingpo people in Gengma town was only 1,004.<sup>46</sup> These developments were noted and had an impact on the Myanmar side of the border. Hkanhpa Sadan, for example, discusses in his chapter issues around the building of concrete manau posts in Mandalay not much later than this, and the effect on young Kachin people inside Myanmar when they were destroyed.

While state support was crucial for a successful manau in the PRC from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, as a trans-border people the Kachin from the Myanmar side had a significant role to play in enabling the Jingpo manau to flourish culturally and financially. In my research I found that manau committees in various counties reported different levels of reliance upon Kachin knowledge of manau post designs, music and dance routines, but few with this specialist knowledge remained within the PRC. These Jingpo committees relied upon ritual practitioners among the Kachin to help reconstruct the drawings on the manau posts, and especially to choreograph the routines of the dance leaders.<sup>47</sup>

45. Ibid. figure 12.

46. Ibid. plate 21

47. For particular knowledgeable Kachin figures as well as local figures for the Longchuan manau see Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川* [the Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 81–84. Also Yue Pinrong 岳品榮, *Jingpo Zu Munaozongge Lishi Wenhua 景頗族目瑙縱歌歷史文化* [History and Culture of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau Zumko], 26–27, 31. Specific learning about manau performance in Yingjiang from unnamed Kachin figures see Yingjiangxian zhibianzuan weiyuanhui 盈江縣誌編纂委員會 (YJXZBZWYH) [Compilation Committee of the Yingjiang County Gazetteer], ed., *Yingjiang Xian Zhi 盈江縣誌* [Yingjiang County Gazetteer], 154. For certain named Kachin and Jingpo figures from whom Ruili ritual dance knowledge was obtained see Ruili Shi Shizhi bangongahi 瑞麗市史志辦公室 (RLSSZBGS) 編



Sadan has described how this pattern of interaction was also important in the revival of the Singpho manau in India in the 1980s.<sup>48</sup> Financially, too, cross-border interaction became embedded in the success of the PRC manau because of the support given by a limited number of wealthy Kachin business people who assisted these developments in Yunnan. When the policy of supporting nationality festivals first became firmly established in 1983, following on from which the building of permanent manau fields with large concrete posts became fashionable, donations from Jingpo cadres and ordinary citizens proved vitally important. However, the involvement of some Kachin business people added significantly to the sums that were already being provided by party and government.<sup>49</sup> It is clear, therefore, that the economic vitality of some limited numbers of Kachin business people had an effect upon the cultural regeneration project of the Jingpo in Dehong Dai Jingpo Prefecture. For many, it seems this kind of financial support also acted as a proxy for their cultural-political aspirations in Myanmar in some respects. They could support cultural achievements in Yunnan that were unachievable in Myanmar, especially while conflict continued.<sup>50</sup>

However, Kachin involvements were always limited by strong local contingencies, which dictated that local outcomes and responses should predominate. Not least of these local contingencies was the fact that most Jingpo people in Yunnan were not Christian, whilst the majority of Kachin professed to be so. Undoubtedly, too, Jingpo people were also primarily concerned about the internal dynamics of cultural performance within and between their own communities, not mainly with

[Gazetteer Office of Ruili County], ed., *Ruili Jingpo Zu* 瑞麗景頗族 [the Jingpo Nationality in Ruili], 228, 30, 36, 335.

48. Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma*, 412.

49. I recorded the names of specific donors for constructing Longchuan manau facilities inscribed on the merit monuments at the manau field in 1996. Yup Zau Hkawng's name was not on the list, although he is known to have been actively involved in the manau developments across the region at various times. See the chapter by Lee Jones, this volume, for some discussion of his wider role and reputation. See also Mahkaw Hkun Sa, this volume, for efforts to develop a pan-Kachin movement at this time

50. I am most grateful to Mandy Sadan's insight on the emotion involved behind the donation among the Kachin businessmen to the Jingpo in Dehong at this juncture.

those that related to a wider Jingpo-Kachin framework. The financial boost and support given through provision of ritual expertise coming from across the Myanmar border, even during the conflict period before the ceasefire, was important in giving greater room for manoeuvre to these developments in Yunnan than might have been the case had they been entirely autonomous and disconnected from any sense of wider interactions. Nonetheless, the PRC Jingpo had their own distinctive cultural ambitions and perspectives, which they hoped to foster and nourish in their own right through local organizations.

One of the ways in which the development potential of Jingpo communities in the PRC was considered greater than that of Kachin communities in Myanmar was their capacity to develop local cultural research associations, many of which became affiliated to the objective of manau reform. This was much more difficult to achieve in Myanmar before the ceasefire than in the PRC. 1990 heralded a decade of Jingpo cultural association development, in which there occurred increasingly intensive cross-border cultural exchanges between the Jingpo in Yunnan and the Kachin in Myanmar. This was the period, for example, when the archival research conducted in Kachin State by the Yup Uplift Committee referenced by Mandy Sadan in her work was carried out.<sup>51</sup> These interconnected but distinct projects form part of a collective of activities on both sides of the border, even extending into India with related efforts at Singpho cultural revivalism.<sup>52</sup> In 1990, Longchuan County was the first to set up the Longchuan County Jingpo Culture and Art Studies Association as a NGO. It offered courses on Jingpo literacy and Jingpo culture, organized singing and dancing workshops for youngsters from the countryside, many of whom would then perform at manau festivals. It also promoted the design of Jingpo attire based on traditional motifs.<sup>53</sup> In 1992, Yingjiang County was the second to es-

51. Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma*, 28, note 88. Mandy Sadan, 'Remembering Fieldwork Histories', in *Fieldwork in South Asia: Memories, Moments, and Experiences*, ed. Sarit K. Chaudhuri and Sucheta Sen Chaudhuri (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2014), 94-96.

52. Sadan, *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma*, 406-54.

53. Yingjiangxian zhibianzuan weiyuanhui 盈江縣誌編纂委員會 (YJXZBZWYH) [Compilation Committee of the Yingjiang County Gazetteer], ed. *Yingjiang Xian Zhi* 盈江縣誌 [Yingjiang County Gazetteer], 170-88.

establish a Yingjiang County Jingpo Culture and Art Studies Association, again as a NGO.<sup>54</sup> From 1993–96, the Yingjiang association carried out research not only in the Yingjiang countryside, but also across the border in Laisin and Laiza, in which they documented folk songs, dances, and other customs. Furthermore, in 1994 the association arranged for more than 100 Jingpo people to attend the manau in the Myanmar town of Sadung that followed the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the KIA and the Myanmar Tatmadaw.<sup>55</sup>

In all, the establishment of the reformed manau dance festival as an icon of the PRC Jingpo nationality in the years before the ceasefire in 1994 involved extensive efforts on the part of Jingpo elites and officials to create what they took to be a progressive, civil, powerful and united Jingpo manau dance festival. This Jingpo reformed manau dance festival was undoubtedly a consequence of the new Chinese nationalities policy put in place in the late 1970s. However, in many ways the reformed manau dance festivals were influenced culturally and financially by association with the Kachin across the border during this period, even while the fighting in the Kachin region continued. Although the KIA was still fighting, the internal changes in China and in regional geo-politics had created new opportunities for Kachin and PRC Jingpo to interact socially, economically and culturally, albeit in restricted ways from the late 1980s onwards, and this had an impact on Jingpo cultural politics and representations.

### Manau and Jingpo modernity after the Kachin ceasefire

Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the Jingpo reformed manau became a platform for building a sense of Jingpo modernity. While it made reference to cross-border relationships and comparative contexts, it was also highly local. Nonetheless, immediately following the ceasefire between the KIA and the Myanmar army in 1994, cultural exchanges between the Kachin and Jingpo communities and elites could at last become both more active and more public. Chinese Jingpo congratulatory teams openly visited not only manau at borderland cities and townships within the Kachin State, as these performances again began to be per-

54. Ibid. 140–150.

55. Ibid. 156.

formed independently in Myanmar following the ceasefire, but officials at the Dehong prefectural-level visited Myitkyina, which was under Myanmar military-government jurisdiction. Even more significantly for Kachin–Jingpo relations, in visits to the Kachin State, especially at the prefectural level, the distinctive identity of PRC Jingpo nationality started to become more meaningful to Kachin people through the process of direct comparison and contrast, which was referenced earlier in Enze Han's chapter.

In 2001, the Yingjiang County Jingpo Association of Art and Cultural Studies arranged the visit of a delegation of 255 Jingpo from the Dehong Prefecture and various county offices to attend the large, inaugural manau held in Myitkyina in the newly constituted manau ground mentioned by Hkanhpa Sadan and Helen Mears later in this volume.<sup>56</sup> Several of the delegation members made similar comments to me when I asked them about this visit. In particular, they described how the arrival of the 'Chinese Jingpo' was met with surprise by local people. The delegation had ridden into 'Kachin Land' in more than 30 Mitsubishi four-wheel drive vehicles: 'The Kachin in Myitkyina were not aware of the fact that we have many Jingpo holding high positions in government. They were shocked to see that we Chinese Jingpo are so wealthy as to own so many expensive and high-class vehicles.'<sup>57</sup>

One of the most important ways in which the development of manau activities were mutually inflected at this time was in enhancing Jingpo literacy by the joint-efforts of Jingpo and Kachin elites. In 1995, the now-defunct Committee for Nationality Languages and Written Languages in Dehong Prefecture sponsored an unprecedented international conference in Mangshi City to commemorate the centennial of the Jinghpö written language.<sup>58</sup> Chinese scholars, researchers, officials

56. Ibid. 155.

57. E.g. Mu Lenong, personal communication, February 2002; Lahto Murumai, personal communication, September 2014.

58. Budan 布丹, 'Bainian Huihuang Qing Danchen: Jinian Jingpo Wen Chuang Zhi Yibai Zhounian Xilie Huodong Ceji 百年輝煌慶誕辰：紀念景頗文創制100周年系列活動側記 [A Sideways Look at the Series of Activities for the Centennial Anniversary of the Creation of the Jingpo Writing System]', in *Yige Shiji De Zhuiqiu: Jingpo Wen Chuang Zhi Yibai Zhounian Wenji 一個世紀的追求：景頗文創制100周年文集 [One Century's Pursuit: Anthology for the Centennial Anniversary of the Creation of the Jingpo Writing System]*, ed. Qi Dechuan

and representatives of the PRC Jingpo nationality from all over Dehong, Kunming, Beijing, Gengma township, Nujiang Prefecture and Guizhou Province joined scholars from Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, Argentina and the United States at the conference.<sup>59</sup> Yet importantly, this conference saw the development of networks for pursuing a more concerted, wider cultural objective that would connect the Kachin and Jingpo but also reach down to Kachin communities in Thailand and westwards to Singpho areas in India, as also described by Mahkaw Hkun Sa in a later chapter. At the event, the current vice-chairman of the KIA, General N'Ban La, introduced Zhangmo Nong, the pioneering figure in the reform of the manau in China, to one of the wealthiest of Kachin businessmen, Bawmwang La Raw, who figures prominently in the discussion of diaspora Kachin politics in the chapter by Mahkaw Hkun Sa. Because of this connection, Bawmwang La Raw donated to programs promoting Jingpo literacy in Yunnan, as well as contributing to the building of a school at the Longchuan County manau field in 1999 named Hengxing (恆興) in Chinese and *Sahkawng* in Jinghpo. The school was for teaching Jinghpo written languages.<sup>60</sup> Additional ideas and donations were contributed through international connections for sponsoring activities related to the Longchuan County manau.

祈德川 (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1999). 《世紀的回音》編委會 (SJDHYBWH) [Editorial Board of "An Echo to the Centennial"] Bianweihui 'Shiji de huiyin', *Shiji De Huiyin: Jinian Jingpo Wen Chuangzhi Yibai Zhounian (1895–1995)* 世紀的回音：紀念景頗文創制一百周年 (1895–1995) [An Echo to the Centennial: In Memory of the Centennial of the Jingpo Writing System (1895–1995)] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2004).

59. Budan 布丹, 'Bainian Huihuang Qing Danchen: Jinian Jingpo Wen Chuang Zhi Yibai Zhounian Xilie Huodong Ceji 百年輝煌慶誕辰：紀念景頗文創制100周年系列活動側記 [a Sideways Look at the Series of Activities for the Centennial Anniversary of the Creation of the Jingpo Writing System]', Bianweihui 'Shiji de huiyin', *Shiji De Huiyin: Jinian Jingpo Wen Chuangzhi Yibai Zhounian (1895–1995)* 世紀的回音：紀念景頗文創制一百周年 (1895–1995) [An Echo to the Centennial: In Memory of the Centennial of the Jingpo Writing System (1895–1995)].

60. Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozuo Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchun 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 – 隴川* [the Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan], 83–84. Lahto Du Zau Gyon 勒佗督早堅, *Jingpo Zu Xiandai Shi 景頗族現代史* [Modern History of the Jingpo Nationality] (Luxi, Yunnan: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 2013), 184–92.

When I arrived in Longchuan in 1996 to participate in the four-day manau, I noticed a tremendous change in the manau field facilities in the village of Pengsheng in Longchuan County compared to conditions seen in 1989. Banners proclaiming the guiding principals of 'constructing the two civilizations' – material civilization and spiritual (cultural and ideological) civilization – hung from every entrance and exit as well as from the various stages. Several monuments listed the names of the contributors to the construction costs of the manau field. Donations were solicited from local Jingpo and Kachin businessmen to construct a permanent manau dance field in the county capital, and it was around this time that similar attempts began in earnest to develop large concrete manau posts and a permanent festival site in Myitkyina, funded largely by local sources, including Yup Zau Hkawng.<sup>61</sup> Buildings were made of more durable material and the dance ground had been closed off with a steel fence. The review stage, which used to be a temporary structure that had to be rebuilt for each festival, was now also a permanent building, having a roof and including a well-sheltered reception area. By the mid-1990s, the building of other permanent manau fields spread steadily into the lower administrative levels. Better-equipped and better-trained performing groups were organized across the countryside. In the late 1990s, local township-level manau festivals were being organized throughout the counties of Yingjiang and Lianghe.

The widespread festive atmosphere of the manau held in the early 2000s was related to the state agenda of 'opening up the west', expanding the tourist industry in Yunnan in general, and in Dehong in particular. During this time the manau became a forum that was increasingly controlled by the economic and tourism objectives of the Yunnan government, which tried to co-opt the festival to its own political and economic agenda. Expanding tourism gradually affected the manau festival in shifting the focus from activities to build Jingpo identity to a more consumption-oriented cultural display and set of related performances. Indeed, the chapter by Helen Mears later in this volume discusses how calendars that entered the Kachin State from Yunnan reflected these interactions, giving a greater focus to comparisons of consumption and wealth across the border. One important turning point appears to

61. See notes 44, 45 above.



have been the 'Kunming International Tourist Festival' held in 2000, at which the Dehong Jingpo manau festival was included as a stop on the tourist route. This began a top-down process by which provincial tourism activities intruded into Jingpo manau festivals. Whether from the Kachin or Jingpo perspective, the fact that by this time the manau in Myanmar had been revived also meant that Kachin politician-business people were less keen to divert their financial support to proxy activities in China. However, by 2000, many of them were also feeling keenly the tightened grip on their finances the loss of independent control of the jadeite mines was causing. There were even rumours that some Kachin business owners who relied primarily on the jade trade were running out of money at this time.

Yet the success of the commercialization of the Longchuan County manau marked a major shift that, after the mid-2000s, resulted in the creation of a fully-fledged cultural industry. In 2004, the Longchuan County government decided to make the Manau Zumko the 'named brand' for Longchuan, and a plan was launched to market Longchuan County as the 'County of the Chinese Manau Zumko'.<sup>62</sup> In 2005, the party and government offices of Longchuan County announced the decision to move the pan-prefectural official dates for the manau festival from the fifteenth and sixteenth of the first lunar month to the first week of the first lunar month of the Chinese Lunar New Year festival proper. In 2006, the previous model of a government-run festival was shifted to a free market model. The manau festival and its related activities were packaged as a project for interested companies to join in open bidding to win the right to run the festival for that year. In Lan Yuzhi's words,

62. Jin Xuewen 金學文 and Zhangmo Nong 張么弄, *Zhongguo Jingpozu Munao Zhi Xiang: Longchuan 中國景頗族目瑙之鄉 - 隴川 [the Home of Chinese Jingpo Nationality's Manau: Longchuan]*, 126-29. Lan Yuzhi 藍玉芝, "Munaozongge" Xiaoying Yinfa De Guannian Chongjipo: Longchuan Dazao Zhicheng Quan Xian Wenhua Luyou Chanye "Jinzi Zhaopai" Jishi "目瑙縱歌" 效應引發的觀念衝擊波: 隴川打造支撐全縣文化旅遊產業"金字招牌" 紀實 [The Conceptual Impact Induced by the "Manau Zumko" Effect: A Record of How the "Golden Name Brand" in the Cultural and Tourism Industry of Longchuan County Was Made], *Longchuan wang 隴川網 [Longchuan County Website]*, (16 August 2009), <http://www.zhglc.com/content/travel/xx/2009/08/20090816-42.html>. Yue Pinrong 岳品榮, *Jingpo Zu Munaozongge Lishi Wenhua 景頗族目瑙縱歌歷史文化 [History and Culture of the Jingpo Nationality's Manau Zumko]*, 103-07.

Manau Zumko had become the 'golden name brand' for Longchuan County and it was supposed to attract further business investment and tourism.<sup>63</sup>

These developments converged perfectly to create a situation in China where the state was the force behind the shift from a people and government-run manau to that of competitive bidding by the market for staging the manau: increasingly, Manau Zumko became a brand name in the local cultural industry. The Yunnan government had made several attempts in the 1980s and 1990s to spur Yunnan's economic expansion through the promotion of ethnic tourism. Yet within a few years following the turn of the century, state policy for cultural industry in Yunnan was decisive in linking tourism to the nationalities. At the end of 2003, the Yunnan provincial government set up the Yunnan Office of Cultural Industries, under the Yunnan Culture Bureau. Similar offices were also established at lower administrative levels. Beginning in 2004, projects were carried out with the backing of all levels of the Publicity Department of the CPC committees and Culture Bureau.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, after the endorsement of the UNESCO 2003 Convention for Protecting the Intangible Cultural Heritage, the Chinese government circulated orders in 2005 calling for the establishment of intangible cultural heritage offices at all levels of the government. These offices were asked to carry out surveys, engage in research, and provide lists of cultural heritage for administrative levels higher up the state infrastructure. The Manau Zumko was selected in 2006 to represent Jingpo intangible cultural heritage at the national level. The development of many Jingpo manau activities from the mid-2000s to the present, therefore, can be understood as the third phase in manau history, during which complicated forces of globalization, indigenization, and commercialization entangled. However, at the same time, it also confirmed the manau stage as a nationally recognised performance space.

63. Lan Yuzhi's article (ibid.) was posted on the Longchuan government website in 2009. She reported that one Baoshan advertising company won the bid and successfully ran the 2007 Longchuan manau and its related activities.

64. Jiang Feng 江楓, 'Yunnan Wenchuan Shinian: Jiaochu Youyi Chengjidan 雲南文產十年: 交出優異成績單 [a Decade of the Yunnan Cultural Industry: An Excellent Grade Sheet Is Turned in]' (2013), [http://yn.yunnan.cn/html/2013-07/29/content\\_2823611\\_2.htm](http://yn.yunnan.cn/html/2013-07/29/content_2823611_2.htm).

Returning now to the issues with which this chapter commenced, it was because of these developments that the Jingpo were recently able to use their new official status to insert themselves as actors in the political relations between Myanmar and China following the resumption of war between the KIO and the Myanmar Tatmadaw in June 2011.

### People's diplomacy

The relative ease of transportation and web communications between the PRC and Kachin State in recent years has compressed temporal and spatial distances between the Kachin and the PRC Jingpo. For some PRC Jingpo, this has fed the imagination of a Kachin and Jingpo unity, as noted earlier in this chapter.<sup>65</sup> Somewhat paradoxically, many PRC Jingpo people consider Myitkyina to be an icon of Kachin/Jingpo civility and, as such, something of a dream city; such notions might be a cause of laughter among present-day Myitkyina residents, upon whom the irony would not be lost as they face their daily struggles with poor civic and urban infrastructure.<sup>66</sup> Yet this perspective reflects that for all Kachin and Jingpo people, particular hopes were raised when the Kachin State was established following independence from the British, and that it seemed to offer great potential for autonomous development, not least in its own capital city. However, the realities of this situation intrude too frequently to nourish such dreaming. While most Chinese Jingpo living in Dehong, except for government officials holding high positions in certain politically sensitive offices, are able to travel between the PRC and Myanmar via many routes, they cannot easily travel to localities under Myanmar jurisdiction without a passport. The Myanmar government irritates and frustrates PRC Jingpo elites and officials, too, in limiting this capacity to connect more freely; the only way the Kachin/Jingpo can experience freedom of travel ordinarily is by traversing the borderlands on cross-border passes, and not as citizens with passports. The renewal of war on the Myanmar side of the border has also shattered the borderline physically as refugees have poured into

65. I know from my fieldwork that the idea of a Kachin and Jingpo unity is shared by a lot of Chinese Jingpo, but not all. Jingpo living in more inland hills might have heard about the war, but know few details. Some residents in Mangshi know little nor care much about the war.

66. I thank Mandy Sadan for information on the comments of Myitkyina residents.

China and bombs have fallen on villages on the PRC side. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Jingpo elites lent their voices to support mediation at the first chance.

Since the renewal of the war, PRC Jingpo elites, officials and ordinary people have expended considerable effort in supporting the Kachin through all means, large and small. Reliable web reports in combination with my own interviews have enabled a listing of public figures whose words and deeds have proved of considerable significance in the evolving PRC and Kachin relationship, especially following events in 2013. Jingpo Yunnan Nationality University faculty member Zhao Xuexian and Dehong Prefectural Government council member Li Xiangqian both urged the PRC government to express their concerns over humanitarian violations brought about by the resumption of warfare between the Kachin and Myanmar forces, cognizant too of the resulting PRC Jingpo demonstration.<sup>67</sup> It has been widely discussed that one Yunnan Provincial official received party permission to mediate between the Kachin representative and the Yunnan CPC following the demonstration. In addition to appeals for formal diplomatic efforts, various Jingpo Cultural Associations in Kunming and Dehong made donations and other forms of direct assistance to the refugees. Additionally, however, discussions on websites formed part of an indirect appeal to the PRC government's diplomatic position and likewise deserve consideration.<sup>68</sup>

The evolving discourse on the Chinese-ness of Jingpo nationality identity is itself a topic that deserves further separate treatment but is also implicated in this effort, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. With the open door policies in place since 1980, many exchanges have taken place between the PRC Jingpo and the Kachin, and these have resumed and become more significant since the breakdown of the

67. Personal communication with Li Xiangqian on 17 September 2014 and with Zhao Xuexian on 16 February 2014. Zhao Xuexian made a public appeal to Chinese government at an interview with the IBTimes Chinese version at 2013-01-17. See International Business Times (IBT) (2013), <http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/trad/articles/19737/20130117/burma-kachin-independence-army.htm>.

68. Several Chinese, Chinese Jingpo and Chinese Burmese authors express their deep concerns about the Kachin/Myanmar war through the web, especially since the breakdown of the ceasefire and the state's acknowledgement that Chinese citizens were freely expressing their concerns to their compatriots at the beginning of 2013. I mention only one Chinese Jingpo below for the purpose of this chapter.

ceasefire in June 2011. Jingpo scholars writing in Jinghpo construct an alternate Jingpo history than that created in the written Jinghpaw of Kachin State utilized by Kachin scholars. Li Xiangqian, Zhao Xuexian, and Doqshi Yongtang, who are all well versed in the writings of Kachin scholars, have all nonetheless developed their own individual discourses on PRC Jingpo Chinese-ness, which have been influenced by Chinese historiography, Kachin writings, and PRC nationality policy.<sup>69</sup> However, the evidence for this, and its potential contemporary significance, can be seen clearly in the discourse on Chinese-ness that arose during international manau-related activities in Ruili in 2014, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. In February 2014, the Ruili City Cultural Communication Association for the China–Myanmar Borderland invited representatives of the Jingpo and Kachin to meet from across the world, but mainly from northern Myanmar and Thailand. Some Kachin delegates told me that they initially expected that this meeting would be between the PRC Jingpo and the Kachin, but the meeting that actually took place took the form of an academic conference concerning the Kachin/Jingpo world diaspora and issues relating to the international study of the Kachin/Jingpo. The co-sponsors of the conference were two institutes on nationalities studies that are located in Kunming.<sup>70</sup> The manau dance festival was held on 21 and 22 February 2014 in Ruili City at the city's permanent manau field. Conference participants attended the opening ceremony for the manau and the conference together in the

69. Li Xiangqian 李向前, *Zou Bian Zhongguo Zhi Dehong Xilie: Jie Mi Jingpozu 走遍中國之德宏系列：解密景頗族* [the Dehong Series of "Walking All over China": Demystifying the Jingpo Nationality] (China Central Television (Video), 2008). Zhao Xuexian (Zunwa Gam) 趙學先, 'Jingpozu Liuyuan Tanjiu 景頗族流源探究 [Exploring the Origins of the Jingpo Nationality]', in *Jingpozu Yanjiu [Studies of the Jingpo Nationality]*, Volume 3, ed. Duo Shidang 奪石當編 (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2013). Doqshi Yong Htang (Doshi Yongtang) 朵示擁湯, 'Shijie Jingpo Ren De Zuji Shi Zhongguo 世界景頗人的祖籍是中國 [The Ancestral Homeland of the Jingpo People All over the World Is China]', Qi Dechuan 祈德川, 'Tanxun Jingpozu Zuyuan Ji Qi Fayuandi 探詢景頗族族源及其發源地 [Exploring the Ancestral Origins of the Jingpo Nationality and Their Homeland]', in *Jingpozu Yanjiu 景頗族研究 [Studies on the Jingpo Nationality]*, ed. 奪石當編 Dang Duoshi (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2013).

70. See note 7 above. As a scholar from Taiwan, I was invited to sit on the review stage at the opening ceremony.

morning of 21 February. All overseas Kachin representatives, scholars or otherwise, formed the 'congratulatory team of foreign scholars and experts'.<sup>71</sup> The well-known young Jingpo blog writer Yue Wenxiang (or Nhkum Brangli) and the former vice-director of the language committee of Dehong Prefecture, who served as the specially appointed organizer for the conference, Doqshi Yongtang, both wrote bilingual papers that were presented at the conference. Yue's paper expressed his understanding of the PRC government's seemingly cold-blooded and careless treatment of the unjust events taking place along the Kachin/Dehong borderland (which even included incidents allegedly carried out by the Myanmar soldiers against PRC citizens and upon properties within PRC territory). He felt this was a consequence of corrupt connivance between the Myanmar military junta and certain PRC high officials and companies. Yue attempted to bridge the gap between the PRC and the Kachin and to reduce any sense of alienation of the Kachin in Myanmar from the PRC. As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, Doqshi Yongtang raised the issue of a potential Kachin identity as Overseas Chinese as a way out of the current Kachin dilemma. Doqshi's suggestion was that a Kachin 'Overseas Chinese' identity could be built upon earlier discourses on the Chinese-ness of the PRC Jingpo nationality. In other words, both figures at the scholarly conference and its other manau-associated events seized upon the opportunity presented to them as Jingpo elites to assume a limited but real agency in ongoing diplomatic efforts, doing so through novel identities and means.

Whether or not the option outlined by Doqshi Yongtang would have much support among the Kachin peoples of Myanmar is a moot point, but the differentiated perceptions of potential development opportunities outlined earlier in this and other chapters may suggest some traction could be given to the idea unless these issues are dealt with in real terms on the Myanmar side. What is clear from this chapter is that, from the viewpoint of manau activities, we learn not only a version of Jingpo history as one unified nationality defined by the state, but also the interstitial histories from borderland perspectives, which makes the prospect of making a unified nationality seem neither inconceivable nor undesirable from the vantage point of these Jingpo writers. Throughout this history of the Jingpo manau, it can be seen that, regardless of the

71. Fieldnote, 21 February 2014.



political and economic differences between the PRC Jingpo and the Kachin, the linguistic, cultural, and social mutuality between them has always played an indispensable role in their histories. This is seen clearly in their mutually inflected histories in the Jingpo Manau Zumko. From the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, what we might call the first phase of the reformed manau, the scope of mutual cross-border visits was still limited. However, during this first stage of the reformed manau, the Jingpo learned from the Kachin elders aspects of how to hold a manau, how to adapt high culture to traditional Jingpo clothing and music, and how to obtain financial support from Kachin businesspersons. Beginning from the latter half of the 1990s and lasting into the mid-2000s, what we might call the second phase of the reformed manau and which also relates to the first decade of the Kachin/Myanmar ceasefire, the Jingpo and Kachin communicated and collaborated towards common goals. In this modernity-friendly manau, substantive interactions were had and this included many successful attempts at setting up educational exchanges in Jingpo literacy. Woods characterizes the economy of the borderland at this stage as a 'black-market economy'. The mayor of Longchuan County from 1996 to 2003, Mao Letuan, considered the inter-government relationship between Myanmar and the PRC as being awkward during this time, like 'hand-shakes between right and left hands'. In contrast to a characterization by Khine Tun of this stage (mentioned above) as epitomizing strategic and bilateral relations between China and the Myanmar military regime, the concerns of the NGO scholar and the Jingpo mayor were both on the borderland. By taking this perspective of the history of the Jingpo Manau Zumko festival we see that it more closely conveys the emotion and agency of the Kachin/Jingpo people in this borderland during this time.

Between the mid-2000s and the present, in the third stage of the globalized, commercialized and localized manau, the Kachin from Myanmar, including those from Myitkyina, were engaged in such activities as sending members to Dehong, and helping Jingpo manau organizers to learn more elaborate dance steps and choreography.<sup>72</sup>

72. The Dehong Cultural, Sports and News Bureau reported the news on the Yunnan Provincial Government's website about the graduation performance of members of the Myitkyina traditional art group, who received training from the Jingpo Ethnic Cultural Troup of Dehong Prefecture. The report also says that this was

All Jingpo manau activities have been exceedingly popular and have flourished progressively. In contrast, following 2011, no manau could be held in Myitkyina and so PRC Jingpo elites and officials hosting manau festivals have made a special effort to invite ordinary Kachin people to those taking place across the border. In 2012, when Mangshi, the capital city of Dehong, staged their international manau to enter the Guinness World Record of '10,000 people's dance' and '1,000 people's dance with knives', more than four hundred Kachin were invited from the Kachin State. The tension between belonging to a shared borderland holding flexible 'citizenship' and being citizens defined by the citizenship of international law – especially at this delicate time between Kachin, Myanmar and the PRC – found a way out through discourses made by dancing diplomacy at the manau.

the fourth training course offered to Kachin people from Myitkyina who were involved as performance personnel. Sports and News Bureau Dehong Cultural (13 October 2014), [http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/Z\\_M\\_001/Info\\_Detail.aspx?DocumentKeyID=DE55F6A688394650A7981B5B8D9613AC](http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/Z_M_001/Info_Detail.aspx?DocumentKeyID=DE55F6A688394650A7981B5B8D9613AC). Retrieved 18 February 2015.

## Contents

*Acknowledgements* xi

*Contributors* xiii

*Editor's Note* xix

1. Introduction (*Mandy Sadan*) 1

### **Longer Histories of Ceasefire**

2. Historical Perspectives on War and Peace in Kachin Space: The First Kachin Ceasefire 1944–1961 (*Robert Anderson and Mandy Sadan*) 29

### **Reflections**

3. Reflections on the Kachin Ceasefire: A Cycle of Hope and Disappointment (*Martin Smith*) 57

### **Political Economies of Ceasefire**

4. Understanding Myanmar's Ceasefires: Geopolitics, Political Economy and State-Building (*Lee Jones*) 95
5. The Commercialisation of Counterinsurgency: Battlefield Enemies, Business Bedfellows in Kachin State, Burma (*Kevin Woods*) 114

### **Cross-Border Diplomacy with China**

6. Borderland Ethnic Politics and Changing Sino–Myanmar Relations (*Enze Han*) 149
7. People's Diplomacy and Borderland History through the Chinese Jingpo Manau Zumko Festival (*Ho Ts'ui-p'ing*) 169

### **Cultural Intimacies of Kachin Nationalism**

8. Conspiracy, God's Plan and National Emergency: Kachin Popular Analyses of the Ceasefire Era and its Resource Grabs (*Laur Kiik*) 205
9. 'Before I joined the army I was like a child': Militarism and Women's Rights in Kachinland (*Jenny Hedström*) 236
10. Counting the Days: The Kachin Ceasefire and the Emergence of a New Graphic Medium (*Helen Mears*) 257

**Local to Global Experiences**

11. A Woman's Life in War and Peace (*Nhkum Bu Lu*) 291
12. Kachin Student Life at Yangon University in the Mid-1990s (*Hkanhpa Tu Sadan*) 308
13. The Founding of the KNO and the Development of a Diaspora Activist Network (*Duwa Mahkaw Hkun Sa*) 330

**Other Ceasefires Within and Beyond Myanmar**

14. The Continuation of War by Other Means: An Anatomy of the Palaung Ceasefire in Northern Shan State (*Patrick Meehan*) 361
15. The Karen and the Ceasefire Negotiations: Mistrust, Internal Segmentation and Clinging to Arms (*Mikael Gravers*) 388
16. Ethnic and Land Conflicts in North East India: Lessons for Myanmar (*Reshmi Banerjee*) 408
17. The Social Memory of the Mizo Buai: Some Comparisons with the Kachin Conflict (*Joy L. K. Pachuau and Mandy Sadan*) 434

**Concluding Remarks**

18. Reflections on Ceasefires Past, Present and Future (*Matthew J. Walton*) 461
- Bibliography 475
- Index 499

**List of Maps**

- 0.1. Political boundaries of areas where the terms Kachin, Singpho and Jingpo are used xxii
- 0.2 Kachin State xxii
- 7.1. Manau sites located in Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture 170
- 14.1. Areas of northern Shan State in which Palaung (Ta'ang) communities live 363

**List of Figures**

- 3.1. The author, Maran Brang Seng, Zawng Hra and Tony Stonor, Houses of Parliament London, 1987 58
- 3.2. Kachin, Mon and Tatmadaw leaders at opening of KIO office Myitkyina, 1998 63
- 3.3. Construction of bridge over Irrawaddy river, ceasefire era 63
- 3.4. Kachin leaders, Tatmadaw officials and diplomats at opening of Shalom (Nyein) Foundation centre, Kachin state, 2001 68
- 3.5. Doctors and nurses, KIO hospital Laiza, 2008 68
- 3.6. Metta Development Foundation, Farmer Field School, ceasefire era 74
- 3.7. Narcotics-burning ceremony, Yangon, 1999 79
- 8.1. Many Kachin patriots are working for a future Kachin national modernity – a homeland yet-to-be. 206
- 10.1. Calendar produced by the Zaiwa Literature and Culture Committee, 2005 263
- 10.2. First page of calendar produced by the Nung Lungmi Cultural Committee, 2002 274
- 10.3. Second page of calendar produced by the Nung Lungmi Cultural Committee, 2002 275
- 10.4. Calendar produced by Nawng Nang Theological College, Myitkyina, 2004 277
- 10.5. Calendar produced by Tokyo Kachin Baptist Church, Youth Department, 2005 281
- 10.6. First page of Myitkyina University Literature and Culture Committee Calendar, 2015 284
- 10.7. Last page of Myitkyina University Literature and Culture Committee Calendar, 2015 286
- 11.1. General Aung San at Myitkyina in 1946 with Kachin women 292
- 13.1. Meeting of KNO and KIO central committee in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 21–22 January 2011 336
- 13.2. KNO founder Duwa Howa Ja La and Duwa Bawmwang La Raw with KIO central committee members at KIO HQ in 1994 337



13.3. KNO chairman Duwa Howa Ja La visiting a UNHCR office in Malaysia, 2006 350

15.1. Soldiers guarding DKBA HQ 393

15.2. The late General Saw Lah Bwe during an interview in November 2015 399

## List of Tables

14.1. Militias in northern Shan State 375

## Acknowledgements

This book developed out of a seminar that was held at SOAS, University of London, in October 2013. The Faculty of Arts & Humanities at SOAS provided funding for the event, with the support of the History Department and the Centre for South East Asian Studies. The event could not have taken place, however, without the support and help of many members of the Kachin community in the London area, who devoted much time to helping organise the day. People who made a significant contribution on the day but who are not contributors to this volume include Kai Htang Lashi, Gustaaf Houtman, Nbyen Dan Hkung Awng, Janet Zuo, Hkun Nawng and Gumring Hkangda. I am also grateful to my students at SOAS, some of whom had only started their undergraduate studies the week before, for the time they voluntarily gave up on a Saturday to help out: Sebastian Rumsby, Aki Shibuya, Zakaria Mahfudz, Lucia Pivetta, Max Lembke-Soh, Georgia Dunant, Toslima Khatun and Zaynab Abdullah. In particular, I want to thank Hkanhpa, who put in a huge amount of time trying to bring some of the papers in this volume to fruition and has, as ever, been ceaselessly encouraging and patient.

Finally, we would all like to dedicate this book to Bianca Son Suantak. Bianca completed her PhD in History at SOAS in 2013. Her thesis was titled 'The Reinvention of the Zo: The Chin, the Lushai and the Kuki 1826–1917 and 1940–1988'. Her father was the renowned Zo historian and intellectual Dr Vumson Suantak, author of *Zo History: with an introduction to Zo culture, economy, religion and their status as an ethnic minority in India, Burma, and Bangladesh* (Aizawl, India, c.1986), which was one of the most significant histories of the Zo people and his work and influence greatly inspired the completion of Bianca's own thesis. Bianca's interests were diverse and included Organizational Psychology,